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School choice is a contentious issue in part because of the lack of agree-
ment on many of the important empirical issues surrounding the policy de-
bate.1Evidence regarding the role of such factors as peers and parents, class
size and teacher quality, competition and bureaucracy, unionization and cur-
riculum design remains hotly debated, and the impact of increased choice on
many of these elements of school quality is still controversial. However, we do
have decades of experience with school choice of a kind somewhat diﬀerent
from what is pondered in many choice-based policy proposals, and it is within
this current system of school choice that at least some agreement can be
found. Although it may therefore be diﬃcult to fully predict the impact of
new choice-based initiatives, information arising from the choices made by
households in the current system may yield important evidence regarding
some neglected empirical issues that are critical for policymakers to consider.
This paper begins by providing evidence regarding one such issue: the
linkage between housing and school consumption, and the impact that
private schools (and private school vouchers) can have by severing this link-
age and thus setting oﬀ a series of general equilibrium eﬀects that are quite
independent from many of the more controversial issues surrounding
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1. Voucher experiments in the United States are still sparse, with only limited empirical in-
vestigations possible (see, for instance, Rouse 1998).school choice. The intuition behind these results is quite straightforward: In
a residence-based public school system, the location of a family’s residence
directly determines which public school that family’s children are eligible to
attend. Housing markets are typically such that low-income families may
not be able to aﬀord housing in high-quality public school districts, which
implies that choice among public schools is greater for some than for oth-
ers. By bringing choice into low-income school districts, private school
vouchers sever the link between school quality and residential location,
thus increasing the value of living in poor public school districts and lower-
ing the value of living in wealthy districts. Such voucher proposals therefore
tend to beneﬁt lower-income households (through a variety of channels)
more than high-income households that are already exercising choice in the
present system. The research summarized in this paper provides evidence
on the potential magnitude of these beneﬁts as well as the likely channels
through which they might emerge under a variety of diﬀerent assumptions
regarding empirical factors that remain controversial.
In addition, the paper proceeds to predict the impact of private school
choice on school quality. Whereas results regarding residential segregation
are rather unambiguous and robust, implications for school quality are
more dependent on the precise underlying assumptions regarding the im-
pact of competition within schools. Results indicate that, under the most
pessimistic assumptions, increasing school choice may lead to surprisingly
small declines in average public school quality and in the overall level of in-
equality in the system, whereas it may yield substantial gains under more
optimistic assumptions. The ﬁrst of these results is surprising because pre-
vious theoretical and simulation approaches have tended to compare the
outcome under private school vouchers to a rather idealized outcome where
all public schools provide equal educational quality, and these approaches
have arrived at the conclusion that increased private school choice must
necessarily lower public school quality and raise inequities in an otherwise
equitable public school system.2 Furthermore, these approaches have
tended not to model the political process through which public school
spending is determined and have thus ignored potential oﬀsetting public
school spending eﬀects as some students leave the public system.3 The ap-
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2. To be fair, the models used to arrive at these analyses were not intended to arrive at pre-
dictions of the overall impact of vouchers but rather to demonstrate some of the trade-oﬀs in-
volved (Manski 1992) as well as explore such issues as the eﬃciency of pricing policies of
private schools (Epple and Romano 1998; Caucutt 2001). Furthermore, it should be noted that
previous approaches have investigated inequities within the public school system (Fernandez
and Rogerson 1996, 1999, for instance) but not in the presence of private school alternatives
and/or vouchers.
3. Political economy models have been used extensively to analyze school ﬁnance issues (as
in, for example, Fernandez and Rogerson 1999) as well as voting on vouchers (Bearse, Glomm,
and Ravikumar 2000; Glomm and Ravikumar 1998), but political economy models have not
previously been combined with multidistrict models of public school ﬁnance, as is done here.proach taken here diﬀers fundamentally in that it incorporates from the
start the very forces that have led to the inequities within the public system
and in that it models explicitly an underlying political process within this
environment. The approach then exploits the semi-competitive nature of
the current public school system (and the resulting observed inequities
across school districts) in order to model the structural parameters under-
lying the decisions made by households. This allows for a calibration of the
model that can replicate current features of the data and then come to con-
clusions about extending competition to private schools in an environment
where political and household choices are endogenously determined. It is
then possible to compare these predictions to actual rather than idealized
prevoucher outcomes.
Section 5.2 provides a basic overview of the methodological approach
taken throughout the paper. Although this approach is diﬀerent from the
reduced-form regression analysis typically employed by empirical re-
searchers, it is an approach particularly well suited for the kinds of issues
that are central to the school choice debate. Section 5.3 goes on to provide
a nontechnical summary of the details of the theoretical assumptions em-
ployed in the model, and section 5.4 provides the results from a number of
policy simulations under diﬀerent assumptions. The remainder of the paper
considers the empirical justiﬁcation for the model’s key assumptions and
the evidence for some of its testable implications (section 5.5) as well as
some policy implications arising from the simulation results (section 5.6).
Finally, section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Predicting the Impact of Increased Choice
from the Current Choice System
Whereas some have proposed marginal choice-based reforms to the cur-
rent system, others advocate making choice the central theme around which
to reform primary and secondary education. Conventional empirical ap-
proaches may be well suited to predicting some of the likely eﬀects of small
changes to the system, but one becomes less conﬁdent in such predictions
as policy reforms get large and aﬀect incentives, actions, and prices
throughout the system. Put diﬀerently, large and discrete policy changes in
an area as central to people’s lives as primary and secondary education may
change incentives in a way that brings to light forces that are unlikely to be
important with small policy changes and impossible to pick up with many
of the commonly employed empirical techniques. The approach taken in
this paper therefore uses data on outcomes under the current limited-choice
system to infer preference and production parameters in a very general
model that incorporates forces likely to be important under large-scale re-
forms. Before that model is presented in section 5.3, section 5.2.1 begins
with a brief discussion of how household choices under the current system
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outcomes can be used as the basis of an approach that can analyze the likely
impact of large policy changes; and section 5.2.3 arrives at some of the ba-
sic features that must be modeled in order to implement this approach.
5.2.1 Choice under the Current System Leads to Observable Outcomes
Choice has been a pervasive feature of school systems in most U.S. states
for the past half century. Parents can participate in the local political pro-
cess that shapes their schools, and they can choose among tens of thou-
sands of school districts or neighborhood school areas in which to reside.
At least in principle, choice among many public schools is therefore perva-
sive. Elite private schools as well as more common parochial schools oﬀer
additional options for those unhappy with the public system, and choice is
clearly being exercised. Approximately 12 percent of U.S. schoolchildren at-
tend private schools; a small but growing number are homeschooled; and,
most signiﬁcantly, many of those households that remain within the public
system consider public school quality carefully when choosing where to
purchase or rent a home. Real estate agents typically come armed with in-
formation regarding public school quality associated with diﬀerent neigh-
borhoods, and such information is increasingly accessible through less for-
mal channels. It is therefore no surprise that measures of perceived school
quality can consistently explain at least a portion of the pattern of residen-
tial location that we observe, and house prices in good school districts are
consistently higher than those in bad school districts.4
At the same time, diﬀering constraints faced by diﬀerent households
clearly imply that some have more choice than others. Career and job con-
straints, for instance, are likely to narrow the number of possible public
school districts that are feasible for diﬀerent households. Furthermore, ei-
ther due to historical forces or because of deliberate zoning policies, lower-
income parents may ﬁnd little or no aﬀordable housing in some of the oth-
erwise feasible school districts and neighborhoods.5 Elite private schools
are available only in some areas and are similarly unaﬀordable for low-
income families, and even parochial schools are likely to be too expensive
for many. Although some parents therefore clearly enjoy many school op-
tions, choice for others may be quite constrained by job considerations,
housing markets, and lack of aﬀordable private school alternatives.
The combination of the exercise of these constrained political, residen-
tial, and school choices then results in various outcomes that we can mea-
sure and observe. House prices diﬀer both within and across school dis-
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4. See, for example, Nechyba and Strauss (1998) and Bayer (1999) for discrete choice ap-
proaches, as well as a long literature on education and house prices with recent contributions
such as Black (1999).
5. Even when lower-quality housing is available in good school districts, capitalization of
public school quality will tend to inﬂate the prices of such houses substantially.tricts, and markets incorporate both house/neighborhood quality and
school quality considerations into these prices. Diﬀering house quality and
community amenity levels result in some mixing of diﬀerent income groups
within districts as well as some stratiﬁcation by income across districts, both
of which can generally be observed in the data. Commonly reported spend-
ing levels in schools reﬂect the result of an aggregation of preferences (how-
ever imperfect) through political institutions and thus give an indication of
the value of per-pupil spending in household preferences. Finally, private
school attendance rates in diﬀerent districts give a measure of discontent
within these districts with local public schools, spending levels, and other
features such as the quality of peer interactions within those schools.
5.2.2 Using Observable Outcomes Today to Predict
the Impact of Increased Choice Tomorrow
Although the choices that households make under the current school sys-
tem—and the observed outcomes that result from these choices—are in-
teresting in and of themselves, they also give rise to several research oppor-
tunities and challenges for those interested in predicting the impact of
expanding school choice. One possible strategy takes as its starting point
the empirical observation of varying degrees of choice within the current
school system (across, say, metropolitan areas) and then attempts to link
speciﬁc observed features of current public or private schools to the degree
of competition faced by those schools.6 A second strategy begins with a
theoretical model that encompasses the forces we think are important for
analyzing school competition, then tries to calibrate that model to replicate
the most important outcomes (income and house price heterogeneity
within and across districts, per-pupil spending levels, private school atten-
dance rates) observed in the data under the current school system, and ﬁ-
nally introduces new policies into the calibrated model to see how such poli-
cies  would change outcomes. The ﬁrst of these approaches therefore
attempts to infer the impact of increased choice directly from current data
and is most appropriate for predicting changes resulting from marginal pol-
icy adjustments. The second approach, on the other hand, uses the data to
generate parameters within a structural model and then asks that model to
simulate the impact of new policies assuming that the underlying structural
parameters (in preferences and production functions) remain unchanged.
Since economists generally are comfortable with the notion that prefer-
ences and production functions themselves are exogenous, the latter ap-
proach allows a full unfolding of all the forces within a general equilibrium
setting where everything else is endogenous. This approach is potentially
most useful for predicting the impact of large and discrete changes in pol-
icy, and it is the approach taken in this paper.
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6. This approach is exempliﬁed in Hoxby (1994, 2000a,b), McMillan (1999), and others.5.2.3 Important Features to Be Modeled under This Approach
In order to implement this approach successfully, however, one must be-
gin by convincingly identifying the core features of the current school
choice environment (as well as specifying functional forms for preferences
and production processes whose parameters are then to be dictated by the
data). It is therefore worthwhile to pause and ask precisely what features a
model would have to have in order to serve as an eﬀective tool for the pro-
posed analysis.
Given the important role of residential location and mobility in the cur-
rent choice environment, one must start with a model that contains a het-
erogeneous housing market, with some locations inherently more desirable
(apart from school considerations) than others. When applied to a speciﬁc
context, such heterogeneity in housing within and across school districts is
important because it serves as one of the limiting factors in school district
choice. Second, in order for a relationship between housing and school
choices to emerge under certain types of school ﬁnancing, the heteroge-
neous houses must somehow be classiﬁed into diﬀerent political jurisdic-
tions. More precisely, it must be speciﬁed whether school ﬁnance decisions
are made at the central level or more locally by regional or district govern-
ments; and it must be made clear how children gain access to particular
schools (i.e., whether this is by living in a given jurisdiction or by some other
rationing mechanism). Third, a meaningful analysis requires the model to
incorporate diﬀerent types of households that face diﬀerent constraints,
where the most important distinction between them is their wealth and abil-
ity. Fourth, in order for parents to be able to choose a school within their
constrained choice set, they must have a way of evaluating school quality
based on observable features within the model. Thus, an education produc-
tion process—or at least a parentally perceived production process—must
be formulated, a task made particularly challenging by the continuing dis-
agreement in the literature regarding what matters in this process. Finally,
both private and public schools can potentially enter the constrained choice
sets of each household, and these choice sets could be expanded by policies
such as private school vouchers. Therefore, we must model the private
school market carefully, allowing for supply responses in case of changing
demand for private schools.
5.3 The Model
The ﬁrst challenge, then, is to construct a tractable and internally consis-
tent model with (a) heterogeneous housing, (b) multiple jurisdictions de-
scribing how political choices regarding funding of public schools and ad-
missions requirements are made, (c) households with diﬀerent wealth and
ability levels, (d) a speciﬁcation of the education production process, and (e)
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available data on outcomes in the current choice environment to infer pa-
rameters of preferences and production processes. A nontechnical discus-
sion of the elements of such a model (detailed more precisely elsewhere) is
oﬀered in section 5.3.1 and is followed by a discussion of how an equilib-
rium arises in such a model (section 5.3.2) and how the various parameters
can be matched to important features of the data (section 5.3.3).7 Once
matched to the data, the model is then shown to be relatively successful in
replicating the outcomes we currently observe (section 5.3.4).
5.3.1 Components of the Model
The policy simulations in later sections are based on a model in which
1,500 types of households that diﬀer in their wealth level and child ability
simultaneously choose where among three school districts and ﬁfteen
neighborhoods (or house types) to live, which school to attend, and how
much public school spending to support at the ballot box. The overall num-
ber of houses available in the three districts is assumed to be equal to the to-
tal number of households in the model. Thus, there is exactly one house per
household, but just as households diﬀer in wealth and ability, houses diﬀer
in quality. More precisely, the three school districts contain ﬁve house types
(or neighborhoods) each, and the total quantity of houses is the same in
each of the three districts. The quality of housing, however, diﬀers among
the three districts, with average quality lowest in district 1 and highest in dis-
trict 3. In addition, housing quality varies both within and across districts,
and some house types in district 1 are of higher quality than some house
types in district 3 despite the fact that average quality is highest in district 3.
The house quality of a type h house in district d is indexed by a parame-
ter kdh, and this parameter enters directly into the utility function that all
households (regardless of wealth and ability) share.8 In particular, house-
holds are assumed to value consumption c and school quality s as well as
house quality kdh. The utility of living in district d and house type h while
consuming school quality s and private consumption c is given by
(1) u(d, h, s, c)   kdhs c ,
and the ﬁfteen house quality parameters as well as  and  are derived from
the data in a way described below. For now it should simply be noted that,
since house prices are used to calibrate the house quality parameters, any-
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7. The earliest theoretical development of the local public ﬁnance portion of this model is
due to Dunz (1985).
8. An alternative way for a model to generate heterogeneity of housing and household types
within districts is to assume housing to be fully malleable and household preferences to diﬀer
in school quality (Epple and Platt 1998). The relative merits of that approach as compared to
the one taken here (in which houses are assumed to not be malleable and preferences are as-
sumed to be identical) are discussed in section 5.5.thing that is captured in house prices is also captured in these parameters.
Speciﬁcally, in addition to standard housing quality measures, these pa-
rameters would capture non-school-related local amenities as well as non-
school-related neighborhood externalities.
School quality s depends on whether the household has chosen a private
school or the local public school. Two inputs are assumed to matter: (a) per-
pupil spending and (b) average peer quality in the school. Per-pupil spend-
ing in the public school is determined through the political process of local
voting (on property taxes) combined with an exogenously speciﬁed state aid
formula (ﬁnanced through state income taxes), whereas spending in the
private schools is set by the school in order to maximize proﬁt. Similarly, the
public school has no control over peer quality but must admit all students
who reside in the district and choose to attend the public school, whereas
private schools are able to set a lower bound on peer quality. (Peer quality
itself is speciﬁc to each household type and is a combination of child ability
and parental income.9) Either type of school then takes its per-pupil spend-
ing x and combines it with average peer quality q to produce s through the
production process given by
(2) s   f(x, q)    x(1– )q  where 0    1.
The parameter   is derived from the data in a way described below, and   is
a function that depends on how the impact of competition is modeled.10
More precisely, current researchers diﬀer on whether public and private
schools face diﬀerent types of production technologies. For many of the ini-
tial simulations reported in the next section, we will therefore assume that
  1, and public and private schools face the same production technology
regardless of the nature of the competitive environment they face.11 Under
such an assumption, the data requirethat both per-pupil spending and peer
quality enter the production process. If only spending mattered, the model
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9. More speciﬁcally, peer quality for household nis given by q(n)  [z(n) a(n)(1– )]/7.5, where
z(n) is household income and a(n) is child ability. The inclusion of both household income and
child ability arises from diﬀerent notions of peer eﬀects. Some view the school peer eﬀect as
operating primarily through parents and their involvement and monitoring of schools (which
we know increases in income; McMillan 1999), whereas others see peer eﬀects as operating
through child ability. The empirical literature oﬀers little guidance as to the appropriate value
for  , which is set to 0.5 in the simulations in this paper. Sensitivity analysis with respect to
diﬀerent values suggests that the precise value of   is not critical for the results.
10. Note that, for purposes of predicting changes in behavior of households, it is unimpor-
tant whether per-pupil spending actually matters in generating better outcomes such as test
scores—a proposition that continues to be surrounded by controversy (Hanushek 1999;
Krueger 1999; Hoxby 2000b). Rather, what matters is whether households value additional
spending in schools, for whatever reason, and it is rather uncontroversial to say that they
might. Just how much households value spending as opposed to peer quality is determined by
the parameter   as it is set in a way to replicate the data. This is described in more detail sub-
sequently.
11. Diﬀerent levels of inputs will of course nevertheless generally result in diﬀerent levels of
school quality among the various schools, both public and private.would predict zero private school attendance even for high levels of vouch-
ers. On the other hand, if only peer eﬀects mattered, no public school could
survive in the model even without any vouchers.12 The assumption of iden-
tical production processes for private and public schools therefore neces-
sarily entails a production process that places weight on both spending and
peers: That is,  falls strictly between 0 and 1 and is dictated rather precisely
by the data. In later simulations, however, we will allow technologies be-
tween schools to diﬀer through the function   in ways that will be made
more precise in the section “School Quality When Public Schools Respond
to Competition.” These alternative models of school production essentially
permit private schools the additional advantage of more eﬃcient resource
use. However, here again the data will restrict just how much private schools
can diﬀer from public schools while still permitting the model to predict ac-
curately the levels of private school attendance that are observed. Speciﬁ-
cally, as private schools gain a competitive advantage in terms of eﬃcient
resource use, their other large competitive advantage (being able to select
peers) must take on less importance: That is,   decreases as resource use is
assumed to be more eﬃcient in private schools. Since   cannot fall below
zero, the data therefore place a natural bound on how large the eﬃciency
advantage of private schools can be in the model. The “assumption” that ei-
ther peer eﬀects play an important role or private schools are more eﬃcient
(or some combination of the two) is therefore not an assumption at all.
Rather, it is an empirical conclusion that arises from the need to accurately
predict current private school attendance rates.
A second concern in modeling school production is that researchers cur-
rently know little regarding the precise way in which peer eﬀects enter
school production or parentally perceived school production. The most
common assumption in the literature is that such peer eﬀects are of the form
modeled in equation (2), where the mean of peer quality enters school pro-
duction, and where mixing of peers consequently beneﬁts lower peer qual-
ity children at the expense of high peer quality children. Alternatively, it
may be the case that, under certain types of curriculum arrangements, not
just the mean but also the variance of peer quality is important. This form
of peer eﬀects is incorporated into the model through the function   in the
Section on “School Quality When Public Schools Respond to Competi-
tion” under the heading of “curriculum targeting.”13As is illustrated in that
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12. This is because the main competitive advantage a private school has in the model when
production technologies are identical to those of public schools is the ability to select its inputs,
particularly the peer composition. When peer composition is assumed not to matter, then
there is simply not enough of a competitive advantage for private schools to convince anyone
to pay for them. On the other hand, if that competitive advantage is too large—that is, if peers
matter too much—then private school markets can attract all students away from public
schools.
13. One way of distinguishing these two views of peer eﬀects would be to call the former the
“American view” and the latter the “European view.” More precisely, in the United States theresection, the latter formulation of peer eﬀects tends to produce substantially
more favorable impacts of vouchers on school quality. Finally, the degree of
tracking that is present in public schools clearly aﬀects the way in which
peer eﬀects matter. Although tracking is not included explicitly in the
model, it should be pointed out that—conditional on whatever level of mix-
ing occurs in public schools—parents must still have preferences that place
weight on peers in order for any model of this kind to replicate private
school attendance levels we actually observe in the data. Thus, the presence
of tracking would not in fact alter the initial calibration of the model, but it
would cause us to expect an increase in tracking as competition increases,
a process that is modeled in the section “School Quality When Public
Schools Respond to Competition” as an increase in curriculum targeting
within public schools.
5.3.2 Deﬁning an Equilibrium in the Model
An equilibrium in the model occurs when each actor is doing the best he
or she can given the features of the economy that can be observed, and when
those features are consistent with the underlying political and production
processes. Thus, an equilibrium must specify those aspects that everyone
can see—house prices, tax rates, public and private school quality levels—
and these must be such that (a) no private school or potential private school
could increase its proﬁts by exiting or entering the market, or by changing
its pricing or admissions policy; (b) no household wants to move or change
schools; (c) all tax rates are consistent with majority rule yielding balanced
government budgets; and (d) public school quality in each district arises
from the inputs allocated to the public schools through the decisions of
households to attend (thus determining peer quality) and the decisions re-
sulting from the public choice process (which determines per-pupil funding
levels). Although the formal deﬁnition of equilibrium and the necessary
mathematical proof of its existence is given elsewhere (Nechyba 1997a,
1999), this section provides a brief overview of the issues involved. In
essence, we can view a full equilibrium as consisting of equilibrium in three
diﬀerent areas: the private school market, the housing market, and the po-
litical market. I discuss each in turn.
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tends to be an eﬀort to teach a relatively similar curriculum to all ability types within the same
school through the age of eighteen, when a sharp ability-based separation takes place, whereas
in Europe students are typically separated into diﬀerent schools based on ability at a much ear-
lier age and then taught very diﬀerent subjects intended to prepare them for very diﬀerent
tasks. Under the U.S. system, it may well be the case that the presence of higher-ability students
beneﬁts lower-ability students that are being taught similar subjects, whereas in Europe such
mixing would simply get in the way of the rather diﬀerent missions of schools that are target-
ing curricula to diﬀerent ability types. Some have argued that the introduction of competition
may tend to lead to a more European peer eﬀect because schools would diﬀerentiate them-
selves horizontally by targeting to diﬀerent types of students.The Private School Market
Recall that private schools compete along two dimensions: They set both
a per-pupil spending level and a minimum peer quality admissions level.
The assumption of perfect competition in the private school market then
leads to a relatively straightforward private school hierarchy. Speciﬁcally,
private schools (to the extent that they exist in equilibrium) are composed
of children from the same type of household, and the tuition charged to
each household is equal to the most preferred per-pupil spending level of
that household. To see this, suppose either of these conditions were not sat-
isﬁed in equilibrium. If the school consisted of several types of peer groups,
then a new school could enter, set a higher minimum peer admissions level
while charging the same tuition, and make the same proﬁt as the existing
school. Similarly, if tuition were greater than per-pupil spending, a school
with the same admissions rule and per-pupil spending level but slightly
lower tuition could enter and make positive proﬁts. Thus, equilibrium in the
private school market simply means that, if a particular household type de-
manded a private school with that household’s peer quality and that house-
hold’s most preferred level of spending, then such a private school will be
available.14 As a result of perfect competition, private schools make zero
proﬁts.15
The Housing Market
When households in the model evaluate which house type (or neighbor-
hood) in which school district to choose, they can then check easily how
much utility each option oﬀers. For example, in evaluating the utility from
house h in district d, a household would calculate both the utility of resid-
Introducing School Choice into Multidistrict Public School Systems 155
14. The equilibrium prediction of homogeneity of peer quality within each private school is,
of course, somewhat extreme and not meant to be a perfectly realistic outcome. It arises from
two particular assumptions in the model. First, the production process assumes no economies
of scale in school production, thus permitting small schools in the model to arise easily. Even
if economies of scale were explicitly introduced, however, the model would still predict relative
homogeneity given the discrete number of household types, and unless such scale economies
were substantially larger than is indicated by any of the available empirical estimates, the sim-
plifying assumption of no scale economies does not result in substantial qualitatively or quan-
titatively diﬀerent implications. Second, I am explicitly not allowing price discrimination
within a school such as that used in Epple and Romano (1998) and Caucutt (2001). If private
schools can observe peer eﬀects, these papers have demonstrated that pricing of these peer
eﬀects is proﬁt-maximizing and eﬃcient—and results in a diﬀerent form of cream skimming.
Although it is unclear from the current empirical literature to what extent such diﬀerential
pricing is actually practiced in private schools, it is certain that at least some does indeed take
place, although probably not as much as predicted by Epple and Romano (1998). To whatever
extent this would occur, some heterogeneity within private schools would, however, emerge.
15. An observationally equivalent set of assumptions for the model employed here would be
that private schools, rather than being proﬁt maximizers constrained to charge a single price,
are exclusionary clubs of parents who agree to an equal cost-sharing rule (Nechyba 1999).ing there while attending the district’s public school and the utility of resid-
ing there and attending the private school oﬀered by the market (i.e., a
private school with that household’s peer quality and most preferred level
of tuition). The utility household n obtains from living in this house and at-
tending public school is given by u(d, h, sd, cdhn) where sd is district d’s public
school quality and cdhn is the level of private consumption that is equal to
household n’s after-tax income minus the property tax–inclusive house pay-
ment required to live in house (d, h). The utility from living in the same
house and attending private school, on the other hand, is given by u(d,h,sn,
cdhn –  n), where sn is the private school quality oﬀered to household n by the
market, and  n is the private school tuition required of household n. Thus,
for a given location, public schools have the advantage that they permit
higher private consumption, whereas private schools might oﬀer higher
school quality (due to their ability to tailor tuition to household demand,
due to their ability to restrict access to lower peer quality students, and—in
some speciﬁcations of the model—due to their more eﬃcient use of re-
sources).
Given house prices, tax rates, and public school quality levels, a house-
hold can therefore determine the utility of a house h in district d as simply
the higher of u(d, h, sd, cdhn) and u(d, h, sn, cdhn –  n). The housing market is in
equilibrium (given public school quality and tax rates) if every household
chooses its most preferred location at the prevailing house prices and, as a
result, all houses are occupied.
The Political Market and Full Equilibrium
Finally, residents of each district are assumed to vote on local property
tax rates knowing that local tax revenues, supplemented by state funds
through a prespeciﬁed state aid formula, will translate to spending on
public education.16 Alternatively, for versions of the model in which fund-
ing of public schools is equalized and centralized, residents of all districts
vote on a state income tax rate with the understanding that revenues sup-
port equal levels of per-pupil spending in all districts. Households that send
their child to public school have single peaked preferences over property tax
rates (Nechyba 1997a), as do those who send their child to private school
(Nechyba 1999) under certain voter myopia assumptions. For any given dis-
tribution of the population into districts, a political (voting) equilibrium
therefore exists.17 A full equilibrium is then a partition of households into
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16. In addition, a state income tax rate suﬃcient to fund state aid (and vouchers in later sim-
ulations) is imposed.
17. These myopia assumptions are relatively standard in the literature and roughly assume
that households hold a variety of factors ﬁxed when voting. The assumptions essentially re-
quire voters to hold expectations that, although accurate in equilibrium, are not accurate out
of equilibrium. For details on the required voter myopia assumptions to insure this single-
peakedness of preferences, see Nechyba (1999). It should also be noted, however, that single-
peakedness is actually a stronger condition than what is required for a voting equilibrium tohouse types and school districts, a price for each house type, a local prop-
erty tax rate for each district, a state income tax rate, and an indication of
who goes to public and who goes to private school, such that private school
markets and housing markets as well as the political market are in equilib-
rium.
5.3.3 Matching Parameters to Data
The three school districts in the model are intended to be representative
of the several hundred low-income, middle-income, and high-income
school districts located in four New Jersey counties (Bergen, Hudson, Es-
sex, and Union Counties) that include the suburbs of New York City. More
speciﬁcally, using the 1990 School District Data Book (National Center for
Education Statistics 1995) and census (Bureau of the Census 1992) data
from all districts in these four counties, school districts in these counties
were divided into three categories by median household income such that
each category ends up with roughly equal numbers of households. The fea-
tures of the model to be matched to these data are (a) the income/wealth and
ability distributions; (b) the parameters in utility and production functions
of equations (1) and (2); and (c) the formula of state aid that is taken as given
by voters.
Income/Wealth and Ability Distributions
The simulation model begins with twenty diﬀerent income levels en-
dowed with ﬁfteen diﬀerent types of houses, yielding a total 300 diﬀerent
endowment or wealth levels. Incomes in the model range from 1 (corre-
sponding to $10,000) to 20 (corresponding to $200,000) and represent a dis-
cretized version of the actual household income distribution in the data,
and house values (which are properly interpreted as annualized ﬂows of
housing services) range from 0.3 to 3.5. Since income types are initially
spread uniformly across the ﬁfteen house types, the addition of housing en-
dowments has the eﬀect of smoothing the income distribution in the
model.18 In addition, ability endowments take on ﬁve diﬀerent possible dis-
crete values, which are set to range from 1 to 10. Empirical estimates of the
correlation of parental and child income of 0.4 (Solon 1992; Zimmerman
1992) are used as a proxy for the correlation of parental income and child
ability.19 The addition of ﬁve ability endowments to the 300 income/wealth
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exist when voters have a private alternative to the publicly provided service (Epple and Ro-
mano 1996; Glomm and Ravikumar 1998), although weaker conditions are diﬃcult to guar-
antee easily within the present setup.
18. It is important to note that, although this implies that some low-income households in
the model are initially endowed with expensive houses, this is not the case once the equilibrium
has been calculated, when such houses would have been traded at market prices.
19. One can also interpret the correlation between parental and child income of 0.4 as an up-
per bound on the correlation between parental income and child ability because of the corre-
lation of school quality and parental income. Sensitivity analysis with versions of the modelendowments then yields a total of 1,500 diﬀerent types of households in the
model.
Parameters in Utility and Production Functions
More challenging is the process of setting the parameters in the utility
and production functions. These parameters include the housing quality
parameters (k11, . . . , kdh, ...   k35), the preference parameters   and  , and
the production parameter  . The methodology used to calibrate these pa-
rameters builds on that of Nechyba (1997b, 2000) and is outlined more fully
in Nechyba (forthcoming). The method translates a near-continuum of
house qualities observed for each district type into ﬁve discrete quality in-
tervals (neighborhoods) of equal sizes. It starts by assuming an underlying
utility function u(h, s, c)   h s c  where h jointly captures housing and
neighborhood quality and is interpreted as the annualized ﬂow of housing/
neighborhood services. Substituting equation (2) for s, this utility function
can be rewritten as
u(h, x, c; q)   h [x(1– )q ] c     h x(1– ) c ,
where q is equal to peer quality and   q  . When h, x, and c are treated as
choice variables in an ordinary maximization problem, the exponents  ,
(1– ) , and  can then, without loss of generality, be normalized to sum to
1 and interpreted as budget shares. Thus, I calculate the budget shares for h,
x, and c for a hypothetical “median household” that consumes the imputed
median annualized ﬂow of housing/neighborhood services (in the data),
earns the median income, and chooses the mean school spending level ob-
served in the New Jersey districts, and these budget shares become our esti-
mates of  , (1 –  ) , and   (equal to 0.22, 0.12, and 0.65, respectively).20
Of course, housing in the model is not a continuous variable h, but rather
consists of a discrete number of house/neighborhood quality levels denoted
by (k11, . . . , kdh, ...   k35) in equation (1). I therefore combine the housing
value distribution data from the School District Data Book with our esti-
mate for   to calibrate the ﬁfteen values for kdh across the three representa-
tive school districts. In particular, I take the housing distribution for all
houses in districts of a particular type (i.e., low-, middle-, or high-income as
deﬁned above), ﬁnd house values at the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and 90th per-
centile (corresponding to neighborhoods 1 through 5 in district 1) and con-
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that drive the correlation to 0, however, suggest that this makes little diﬀerence for the results
I report. In particular, changing the correlation to 0.2, for instance, results in essentially no
change in the results of tables 5.4 and 5.7. Results in tables 5.5 and 5.6 are aﬀected slightly in
that public school quality levels in the poor district are slightly lower, and the impact of vouch-
ers on public school levels is slightly less favorable. Overall, however, these diﬀerences in results
are minor and therefore go unreported.
20. Given data on house prices rather than ﬂows of housing services, the median annualized
ﬂow of housing/neighborhood services is calculated for the median house value in the data as-
suming a 5.5 percent interest rate.vert these to annualized housing ﬂows (using a 5.5 percent interest rate). I
then combine these annualized ﬂow values with the exponent   to arrive at
the ﬁve housing (or neighborhood) quality parameters for this representa-
tive district.21 As noted in an earlier section, this methodology—because it
employs all the information contained in housing prices—is quite general
in that it incorporates not just house quality measures but also non-school-
related neighborhood amenities and non-school-related peer eﬀects into
the kdh quality parameters.22
Finally, although the calibration procedure above has placed a restriction
on the values of   and   (given that [1 –  ]  0.12 from the budget share
exercise), the precise values of   and   are set to match private school at-
tendance rates. Recall from equation (2) that   is the weight on peer quality
(as opposed to per-pupil spending) in the school production function.
When   is set to 0, school quality diﬀerences are determined solely by per-
pupil spending diﬀerences, which, in this model, yield zero private school
attendance even if private school vouchers are introduced at relatively high
levels. On the other hand, if  is set close to 1, public schools cannot survive
even without private school vouchers. As   rises from 0 to 1, private school
attendance increases monotonically, and   is set to replicate as closely as
possible the level of private school attendance observed in the data (yield-
ing   0.475). Given the restriction that (1 –  )  0.12, this also deter-
mines the value of   (  0.229). When an additional eﬃciency advantage of
private schools is introduced in the section on “School Quality When Public
Schools Respond to Competition” through the function  ,   is adjusted
(downward) so as to continue to allow the model to accurately predict
private school attendance rates.
State Aid Formula
As argued in MaCurdy and Nechyba (2001), it is diﬃcult to construct
state aid formulas from statutory language because of the fungibility of aid
and the subtle trade-oﬀs that local policy makers are aware of but that are
unobservable to the outsider. Rather than attempting to mimic a statutory
Introducing School Choice into Multidistrict Public School Systems 159
21. More precisely, suppose that for houses in districts falling into district category 3 (i.e.,
high-income districts), the annualized ﬂow of housing services for a house at the 50th per-
centile of the distribution is 1.5 (corresponding to $15,000). The housing quality parameter for
neighborhood 3 (the median neighborhood) in district 3 is then just equal to (1.5) , i.e. k23  
(1.5)    (1.5)0.22   1.093. This procedure is then similarly applied to other district types to ar-
rive at housing quality parameters for all neighborhoods in all representative districts. These
parameters are reported in Nechyba (forthcoming).
22. It should be noted, however, that these neighborhood quality measures are assumed to
stay constant throughout the policy simulations. This implies that, although the benchmark
equilibrium presented below accurately captures current neighborhood externalities, the sim-
ulations do not allow for a change in these externalities as populations migrate. However, as I
have argued elsewhere (Nechyba forthcoming) and will argue again in what follows, this actu-
ally implies that the migration results highlighted in the paper are understatedand would prob-
ably be stronger if neighborhood externalities were endogenized.formula, I therefore implement a state aid formula that combines block
grant and matching grant elements (as deﬁned in Nechyba 1996) in such a
way as to allow the model to replicate the levels of per-pupil spending ob-
served in the data.
5.3.4 The Calibrated New Jersey Equilibrium
With the distributional properties and functional parameters chosen, the
computer model is then asked to generate an equilibrium. If the calibration
is successful, the stylized facts in the data should be approximately repli-
cated by the computer simulation. Table 5.1provides numbers for key equi-
librium values generated by the computer model when   1, and table 5.2
translates these to be comparable to the numbers in the data employed to
calibrate the model. Overall, the match between the predicted values from
the computer model and those found in the data seems reasonably close
(with some exceptions).23 The remaining simulations then employ the same
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Table 5.1 Benchmark Equilibrium to Replicate New Jersey Data
Average Average Property Fraction Per-Pupil School
Income Values Private Spending Quality
District 1 3.1120 0.6121 0.2000 0.6652 0.4322
District 2 4.6216 1.0720 0.2250 0.7910 0.6178
District 3 6.5863 1.5248 0.1250 0.8621 0.7803
Table 5.2 Predictions versus Data
Representative School Districts
Low Income Middle Income High Income
(d = 1) (d = 2) (d = 3)
Mean house value $157,248 $192,867 $271,315
Predicted mean land valuea $117,412 $205,629 $292,484
Median household income $30,639 $45,248 $67,312
Predicted mean household income $31,120 $46,216 $65,863
Per-pupil spending $6,702 $7,841 $8,448
Predicted per-pupil spending $6,652 $7,910 $8,621
Fraction choosing private school 0.21 0.23 0.20
Predicted fraction in private school 0.20 0.23 0.13
Fraction raised locally 0.52 0.77 0.87
Fraction raised locally in model 0.52 0.77 0.87
aCalculated from static values assuming 5.5 percent interest rate.
23. The generated data also match well in terms of other moments of the within-district dis-
tributions of house values and income levels. In fact, the calibration method seeks to match
not only the means but also the variances of these distributions. For space considerations,
these details go unreported here.income/wealth/ability distributions for the 1,500 household types, and the
same parameters for utility and production functions (with adjustments
made only to  as  is altered in the section on “School Quality When Public
Schools Respond to Competition.” The New Jersey speciﬁc state aid for-
mula, however, is not employed in all simulations because some are in-
tended to reﬂect results in more stylized state-ﬁnanced or locally ﬁnanced
systems.
5.4 Policy Simulations
Two types of predictions arise from the policy simulations reported in
this section. First, a substantial portion of the current level of income-based
residential segregation can be attributed to the limits on competition inher-
ent in the current public school system, and the fostering of additional
private school choice has the potential to dramatically reduce this kind of
segregation. This prediction is robust to the inclusion of various controver-
sial assumptions regarding other forces unleashed by increased competi-
tion. On the other hand, assumptions regarding the impact of competition
on school behavior do matter for predicting the degree to which increased
competition from private schools may aﬀect school quality. Such policies
may create winners and losers while leaving average school quality roughly
unchanged, or they may create substantial increases in school quality. Sec-
tion 5.4.1 focuses on the ﬁrst of these predictions, and section 5.4.2 dis-
cusses the second.
5.4.1 Public Schools, Residential Segregation,
and Private School Choice
It is apparent, both in the data and the benchmark equilibrium (which is
relatively consistent with the data) that there is a substantial degree of resi-
dential segregation by income across school districts. Given the interdistrict
distribution of housing quality, this is of course no surprise. The simulation
results reported in this section, however, suggest an additional role played
by the rules inherent in diﬀerent types of school systems, and they suggest
a large potential for private school vouchers to change the degree of resi-
dential segregation. In the following section, I begin by investigating the
school-related causes of segregation in the absence of vouchers, and the
subsequent section builds on these intuitions and investigates the role of
vouchers.
The Role of Private and Public Schools without Vouchers
The results of ﬁve simulations are reported in the ﬁve rows of table 5.3,
which is taken from Nechyba (2002). The ﬁrst row establishes a benchmark
for the degree of residential segregation implied simply by the housing mar-
ket absent any distortion through the public school sector. This is accom-
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ing all households in the model to choose private schools. Housing price
diﬀerences now reﬂect solely the house/neighborhood quality diﬀerences
embodied in the kdh values in equation (1), and no public choices regarding
schooling interfere with where households choose to live.
Next, the second row reports simulation results in which private schools
are prohibited and all public schools are ﬁnanced at the local level through
a local property tax. The diﬀerence is striking: The residence-based public
school system (in the absence of private schools) introduces a substantial
degree of segregation, as evidenced in both average incomes and average
property values across the three districts. For instance, the ratio of average
income in district 3 to average income in district 1 rises from 2.62 to 4.87,
and the ratio of average property values in district 3 over those in district 1
rises from 1.68 to 3.86. Capitalization of public schools (which is absent in
the ﬁrst row but not the second) raises average housing values in the wealthy
district by nearly 50 percent while lowering them in the poor district by sim-
ilar magnitudes.
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Table 5.3 Schools and Residential Segregation
Income Property Values
Ratio: Ratio: Average Income ($) Average Property Values ($)
Public Dist. 3 Avg./ Dist. 3 Avg./
Financing Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Avg. Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Avg.
Nonea 25,700 50,175 67,325 2.62 8,254 11,844 13,892 1.68
No private 
schools
Local taxb 17,628 39,647 85,925 4.87 5,301 10,639 20,457 3.86
State taxc 19,875 42,250 81,075 4.08 5,322 11,507 20,204 3.80
Private schools
Local taxd 29,725 50,262 63,212 2.13 6,424 11,038 15,370 2.39
State taxe 29,891 51,309 62,000 2.07 6,177 11,800 16,490 2.67
Note: Property values are expressed as annualized ﬂows.
aThis simulation sets public spending to zero and assumes only private schools operate.
bThis simulation prohibits private schools and assumes all funding for public schools comes from local
voting on a proportional local property tax. All tax revenues within a district are assumed to be spent on
schools in that district.
cThis simulation prohibits private schools and assumes all funding for public schools comes from voting
on a proportional state income tax. Under this state system, all public schools receive the same per-pupil
funding.
dThis simulation allows a full private school market and assumes that all funding for public schools comes
from local voting on a proportional property tax. All tax revenues within a district are assumed to be
spent on schools in that district.
eThis simulation allows for a full private school market and assumes that all funding for public schools
comes from voting on a proportional state income tax. Under this state system, all public schools receive
the same per-pupil funding.One natural reaction to this comparison might be to suspect that the dra-
matic diﬀerence in the ﬁrst two rows of the table is due to the decentralized
nature of public school ﬁnancing in the second row. The third row therefore
reports simulation results from a state income tax–supported equalized
public school system, with private schools again prohibited. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, the results are rather similar to those of the second row, implying
that the increase in segregation from row 1 to row 2 is due primarily to the
switch from a purely private to a purely public system and only secondarily
due to the level of decentralization of public ﬁnancing.
Finally, the fourth and ﬁfth rows repeat the previous two simulations but
this time permit the emergence of a private school market. Again, the re-
sults are striking: Not only does the emergence of the private school market
alleviate the segregation observed in the purely public systems, but it actu-
ally produces less income segregation than exists in the purely private sys-
tem, in which public schools played no role in where households chose to re-
side. Given that public school quality continues to increase with community
wealth, however, capitalization of school diﬀerences must—and does—
persist in equilibrium. Thus, under local public ﬁnancing, capitalization
still raises average property values in district 3 by 11 percent and lowers
them in district 1 by 28 percent.24 This yields the curious outcome that the
district 3 to district 1 ratio of average district income actually falls below the
pure private simulations (ﬁrst row), but the similar ratio of average property
values settles well above the pure private benchmark (ﬁrst row).
These seemingly contradictory results on income segregation and capi-
talization, however, are closely linked. Consider a relatively high income
household that resides in district 3 under both the purely public and the
purely private systems. Under the public system the household chooses dis-
trict 3 because this is the only way to consume high-quality education. Un-
der the private system, on the other hand, there is no reason for a household
to choose any particular district: The only factor that matters is housing/
neighborhood quality. When a private market is introduced into a public
system, however, an important eﬀect emerges for households considering
private schooling: The diﬀerence in public school quality is capitalized into
house prices (albeit at a lesser rate than under pure public ﬁnancing), thus
making the same house (if it exists in both districts) substantially cheaper in
the poor district than in the rich district. In the case of local public ﬁnanc-
ing, this results in an average price diﬀerence of approximately 40 percent
for the same type of house in district 3 versus district 1. Unlike the case of a
purely private system, this capitalization of public school diﬀerences then
gives rise to rather strong incentives for those choosing private schools to
choose a house in the poor district—even if that house is of suboptimal
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24. These capitalization diﬀerences appear even higher in the last column (under state fund-
ing) for reasons addressed elsewhere (Nechyba forthcoming).quality. Households with high-ability children receive the biggest payoﬀ
from opting out of the public system, as do middle- to high-income house-
holds. Thus, the introduction of private schools into a public system—
whether state- or locally ﬁnanced—provides incentives to middle- and high-
income families (with high-ability children) to settle in poor districts. As a
result, average income diﬀerences narrow substantially more than property
value diﬀerences that continue to capitalize public school quality.25
Vouchers and Segregation
Tables 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6report simulation results for three diﬀerent public
school ﬁnance regimes (local, state, and the system calibrated to the New
Jersey data) and three types of vouchers: The top portion of each table sim-
ulates vouchers that are universally available; the middle portion simulates
vouchers targeted only to residents of district 1; and the lowest portion re-
ports results from the introduction of vouchers targeted only to households
earning below $25,000. Vouchers simply allow eligible households to re-
deem the face value for that level of private school tuition, and they can
freely supplement the voucher amount.
The impact of private school vouchers on segregation then follows
straightforwardly from the logic behind the previous results. To the extent
that a voucher causes someone who previously chose public schools to
switch to private schools, the same price incentive to settle in the poor rather
than the rich district applies. At the same time, however, interdistrict housing
price diﬀerences narrow as more households choose private schools in poor
districts and as voucher levels increase the value of housing in those districts.
Thus, two opposing eﬀects emerge as vouchers are introduced: First, the cap-
italization-induced price incentive for private school attending households to
reside in poorer communities applies to a larger number of households, thus
causing households with incomes above the average for district 1 to immi-
grate and raise average income. Second, this price incentive declines as hous-
ing price diﬀerences narrow and as only lower-quality housing remains for
private school immigrants in district 1—thus causing lower-income house-
holds with high-ability children to compose the additional private school–
attending population. Since vouchers are taken up primarily by households
that are not at the lowest end of the income distribution, however, these eﬀects
are either absent or modest when vouchers are small in size or targeted only
to low-income households (as opposed to low-income districts).
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25. A cautionary note is perhaps in order: Although the results in table 5.3 suggest that seg-
regation would be greater in a purely private system than in mixed private/public system, it
would be stretching the bounds of the model to take this implication too literally. Speciﬁcally,
linking public schooling to housing for decades causes housing stocks to evolve endogenously,
whereas private schooling introduces no such distortions. Because housing is ﬁxed at its pres-
ent quality levels in this paper, the model cannot be used to infer where the segregation would
have ended up under public versus private ﬁnancing. Rather, the model suggests that, condi-
tional on housing markets ﬁxed at present levels and not being allowed to change, a purely
private system would lead to higher levels of income segregation.First, consider the top portions of the tables 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 (which do
not restrict voucher eligibility). For low levels of such vouchers, the ﬁrst
eﬀect dominates, thus causing decreases in income segregation as house-
holds with incomes above district 1’s average immigrate to take advantage
of lower house prices while sending their children to private school. For
higher levels of such vouchers, on the other hand, the second eﬀect domi-
nates, thus causing increases in income segregation.26 The impact of uni-
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Table 5.4 Private School Vouchers under Local Public Financinga
Average Income Property Values Ratio: Private 
($) ($) Dist. 3/Dist. 1 (%)
Voucher 
Amount Dist. 1 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 3 Income Property Dist. 1 Dist. 3
All Eligible for Voucherb
$0 29,725 63,212 6,424 15,370 2.1266 2.3926 30 10
$1,000 31,925 59,800 7,122 14,654 1.8731 2.0576 40 10
$2,500 33,425 58,000 9,097 14,468 1.7352 1.5904 62.5 25
$4,000 33,125 57,425 8,256 13,339 1.7336 1.6157 87.5 30
$5,000 32,900 56,425 8,027 11,816 1.7150 1.4720 100 37.5
Voucher Targeted to District 1c
$0 29,725 63,212 6,424 15,370 2.1266 2.3926 30 10
$1,000 34,050 59,950 7,124 14,974 1.7606 2.1019 37.5 10
$2,500 37,125 54,125 9,979 14,804 1.4579 1.4835 70 10
$4,000 43,275 52,950 13,741 15,141 1.2236 1.1019 100 17.5
$5,000 44,624 53,632 14,282 15,041 1.2019 1.0531 100 19.84
Voucher Targeted Families with Income below $25,000d
$0 29,725 63,212 6,424 15,370 2.1266 2.3926 30 10
$1,000 29,725 63,212 6,424 15,370 2.1266 2.3926 30 10
$2,500 30,185 62,320 6,513 15,220 2.0646 2.3369 45 10
$4,000 32,325 60,340 7,012 15,184 1.8667 2.1654 82.5 7.5
$5,000 32,675 62,250 9,187 15,589 1.9051 1.6969 100 10
Note: Property values are expressed as annualized ﬂows.
aThese simulations introduce vouchers funded by the state through an increase in the state income tax
suﬃcient to balance state budgets. No local sources of revenues are used to fund vouchers. A household
can redeem the value of the voucher as part or all of tuition at any private school that will accept the
household’s child. All public schools are locally funded through proportional property taxes set through
local voting with all revenues staying within the district.
bThis set of simulations assumes that vouchers are not restricted; that is, regardless of where a household
lives and how much income that household earns, the household is eligible for the voucher.
cThis set of simulations assumes that vouchers are restricted to households who reside in district 1—the
poorest district. Within district 1, all households are eligible regardless of household income.
dThis set of simulations assumes that only households with incomes below $25,000 are eligible for
vouchers.
26. If vouchers were to get high enough to cause all public schools to collapse, the degree of
residential segregation would settle to what appears in the purely private system in row 1 of
table 5.3.versally available vouchers on income segregation is, therefore, U-shaped in
the size of the voucher.
Now consider the middle parts of tables 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6—results for
vouchers targeted solely to residents of district 1. For such vouchers, it ap-
pears that the second eﬀect never materializes. Since vouchers are available
only to residents in district 1, migration of private school–attending house-
holds into district 1 continues despite the fact that price diﬀerences are nar-
rowing, with higher-income immigrants out-competing others for the
houses that ensure voucher eligibility despite the fact that some of these
houses are not of high quality. In the middle portions of tables 5.4, 5.5, and
5.6, income segregation therefore continues to decline as houses in district
1 become increasingly valuable to those interested in private education. At
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Table 5.5 Vouchers under Central Public Financinga
Average Income Property Values Ratio: Private 
($) ($) Dist. 3/Dist. 1 (%)
Voucher 
Amount Dist. 1 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 3 Income Property Dist. 1 Dist. 3
All Eligible for Voucherb
$0 29,891 62,000 6,177 16,490 2.0742 2.6696 22.5 15
$1,000 33,375 60,350 6,215 15,599 1.8082 2.5099 30 25
$2,500 34,188 58,254 6,431 15,851 1.7039 2.4648 35 27.5
$4,000 33,500 61,225 7,710 14,908 1.8276 1.9336 62.5 30
$5,000 28,775 64,875 8,327 14,016 2.2546 1.6832 100 100
Voucher Targeted to District 1c
$0 29,891 62,000 6,177 16,490 2.0742 2.6696 22.5 15
$1,000 33,400 59,645 6,242 15,711 1.7858 2.5170 30 12.5
$2,500 39,326 59,825 6,720 15,940 1.5213 2.3720 42.5 11.25
$4,000 43,202 53,861 8,652 16,805 1.2467 1.9423 70 10
$5,000 44,225 58,850 12,509 16,100 1.3307 1.2871 100 37.5
Voucher Targeted Families with Income below $25,000d
$0 29,891 62,000 6,177 16,490 2.0742 2.6696 22.5 15
$1,000 29,891 62,000 6,177 16,490 2.0742 2.6696 22.5 15
$2,500 29,891 62,000 6,177 16,490 2.0742 2.6696 22.5 15
$4,000 30,281 61,348 6,091 16,573 2.0260 2.7209 37.5 12.5
$5,000 31,644 60,858 5,910 16,940 1.9232 2.8663 52.5 10
Note: Property values are expressed as annualized ﬂows.
aThese simulations introduce vouchers funded by the state through an increase in the state income tax
suﬃcient to balance state budgets. A household can redeem the value of the voucher as part or all of tu-
ition at any private school that will accept the household’s child. All public schools are equally funded
through a proportional income tax.
bThis set of simulations assumes that vouchers are not restricted; that is, regardless of where a household
lives and how much income that household earns, the household is eligible for the voucher.
cThis set of simulations assumes that vouchers are restricted to households who reside in district 1—the
poorest district. Within district 1, all households are eligible regardless of household income.
dThis set of simulations assumes that only households with incomes below $25,000 are eligible for
vouchers.the $5,000 voucher level, the decline in segregation is most dramatic, with
district 3’s average income now only 20 percent higher than district 1’s av-
erage income for the local ﬁnancing simulation and property values (despite
higher housing quality) only 5 percent higher.
Both types of vouchers—those that are not targeted and those targeted
to the poorest district—can therefore reduce segregation. However, univer-
sally available vouchers, by privatizing the system at high enough voucher
levels, eventually lead to the level of segregation that would occur in a purely
private system (which is higher than the segregation in the present mixed
system). For universally available vouchers, residential income desegrega-
tion then occurs only at lower levels of vouchers. Vouchers targeted to poor
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Table 5.6 Vouchers under New Jersey Financing Systema
Average Income Property Values Ratio: Private 
($) ($) Dist. 3/Dist. 1 (%)
Voucher 
Amount Dist. 1 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 3 Income Property Dist. 1 Dist. 3
All Eligible for Vouchera
$0 31,120 65,863 6,121 15,248 2.1164 2.4911 20 12.5
$1,000 32,845 63,100 6,534 14,921 1.9211 2.2836 32.5 15
$2,500 35,525 60,050 8,692 14,312 1.6904 1.6466 40 22.5
$4,000 33,350 61,340 9,342 13,164 1.8393 1.4091 67.5 30
$5,000 32,533 61,788 8,210 12,329 1.8992 1.5017 100 32.5
Voucher Targeted to District 1c
$0 31,120 65,863 6,121 15,248 2.1164 2.4911 20 12.5
$1,000 33,250 61,125 6,623 15,120 1.8383 2.2830 35 12.5
$2,500 38,466 56,380 9,922 14,792 1.4657 1.4908 47.5 15
$4,000 43,620 52,890 12,331 14,910 1.2125 1.2091 82.5 15
$5,000 44,130 54,210 12,910 14,225 1.2284 1.1019 100 17.5
Voucher Targeted Families with Income below $25,000d
$0 31,120 65,863 6,121 15,248 2.1164 2.4911 20 12.5
$1,000 31,120 65,863 6,121 15,248 2.1164 2.4911 20 12.5
$2,500 31,120 65,863 6,121 15,248 2.1164 2.4911 20 12.5
$4,000 31,833 64,421 6,223 15,005 2.0237 2.4112 40 12.5
$5,000 32,960 63,184 7,325 15,225 1.9170 2.0785 67.5 10
Note: Property values are expressed as annualized ﬂows.
aThese simulations introduce vouchers funded by the state through an increase in the state income tax
suﬃcient to balance state budgets. A household can redeem the value of the voucher as part or all of tu-
ition at any private school that will accept the household’s child. All public schools are funded through a
mix of local property and state income taxes under a formula replicating the New Jersey ﬁnance system
in 1987.
bThis set of simulations assumes that vouchers are not restricted; that is, regardless of where a household
lives and how much income that household earns, the household is eligible for the voucher.
cThis set of simulations assumes that vouchers are restricted to households who reside in district 1—the
poorest district. Within district 1, all households are eligible regardless of household income.
dThis set of simulations assumes that only households with incomes below $25,000 are eligible for
vouchers.districts, on the other hand, have the potential to increase signiﬁcantly these
desegregating eﬀects by preventing a complete privatization of the public
system and instead making the poor district increasingly attractive to those
seeking private education at high voucher levels.
Finally, the lowest portions of tables 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 report simulation
results for vouchers targeted only to households that earn below $25,000
per year. These households can be grouped into two broad conceptual cat-
egories: those that have high-ability children and those that have low-ability
children. Whatever migration is caused by such vouchers is then primarily
migration of relatively low income families (who are eligible for the
voucher) with high-ability children that locate in the poor district and send
their children to private schools. As a consequence, relatively little change
in the degree of interdistrict income segregation arises (with the ratio of av-
erage income in district 3 to average income in district 1 falling by a modest
5 to 10 percent for high levels of the voucher). Furthermore, the voucher is
actually not used until it reaches at least the $2,500 level.27 Cases between
universally available vouchers and household-targeted vouchers of the kind
modeled here are of course also possible, and results for such vouchers fall
predictably between those reported in the top and bottom portions of the
table panels. For instance, vouchers might be set high for low-income
households and phased out as incomes rise. This would then introduce
some (but not all) of the migration forces unleashed by universally available
vouchers.
Finally, it should be noted that the assumption that housing quality is
ﬁxed (i.e., kdhdoes not change) tends to bias the mobility results emphasized
in this section downward. In the discussion of the calibration of the model,
for instance, I emphasized that the methodology (using housing prices) em-
ployed to calibrate house/neighborhood quality parameters incorporates
not just housing quality but also non-school-related neighborhood ameni-
ties and externalities. Holding the kdh parameters ﬁxed as migration takes
place then assumes that housing qualities as well as non-school-related
neighborhood amenities and externalities are also unchanged. Because the
migration that takes place primarily involves relatively higher income
households moving from middle- and high-income districts to the low-
income district, one would expect kdhvalues to increase in district 1 (as these
households expand houses and add to neighborhood amenities and exter-
nalities) and to decrease in district 3 (as the converse happens there). This
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27. It should be noted that, in voucher experiments in some cities, the demand for low levels
of vouchers targeted to low-income families has been higher than predicted here. Since the
“low-income district” in this model is an aggregation of the lowest one-third of all districts, the
model clearly does not capture desperate conditions in the worst public schools and thus the
demand for vouchers in such districts. It is in such primary inner-city districts, however, that
voucher demand by low-income families has been surprisingly high even when voucher levels
were relatively low. We should therefore expect voucher take-up rates for low levels of vouch-
ers targeted to the poor in very poor districts to be higher than what is predicted by this model.would make district 1 even more attractive, thus causing even less segrega-
tion and a further narrowing of property values. Thus, the explicit exclusion
of adjustments in the kdh values yields lower-mobility results than what the
model would otherwise tend to predict.
5.4.2 School Choice and School Quality
Previous models of vouchers have ignored the implications of voucher
policies on residential mobility and have instead focused on single-
community settings in which private schools compete with a homogeneous
public school sector. The purpose of these models is to study the eﬀect of
vouchers on average school quality as well as the distribution of school
quality across diﬀerent types of students, and to investigate the likely work-
ings of private school markets in a voucher environment. The problem with
comparing pre- and postvoucher outcomes within single-district models of
this kind, however, is that they abstract away from one of the deﬁning char-
acteristics of the U.S. public school system—the degree of inequality in ex-
isting public schools—and thus analyze the issue of vouchers from an em-
pirically incorrect benchmark. We therefore now revisit the competition
forces analyzed in single-district models here in the context of the multidis-
trict model with heterogeneous public schools.
These competition forces are of two general kinds: First, it is argued by
voucher opponents that a policy of private school vouchers will drain the
public system of resources and thus leave it worse oﬀ. The term “resources”
needs to be interpreted loosely to include not only ﬁnancial resources
(which may in fact increase on a per-pupil basis28) but also peer quality (in-
cluding whatever part of peer quality is due to parental involvement
[McMillan 1999]) and political support. Second, it is argued by proponents
of vouchers that the increased competition for students will lead to greater
eﬀort by public schools and that the greater variety of education options
will lead to a better matching of resources with student needs.29 The loss of
resources would, of course, lead to a decline in public school quality,
whereas the competition-induced eﬃciency gains through more eﬃcient re-
source uses and better matching of resources with students would lead to an
increase.30
The next section begins with the version of the model (outlined in section
5.3) that incorporates only the ﬁrst of these forces—that is, the cream-
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28. If the voucher amount is below per-pupil spending in the public school, then, assuming
no change in overall government spending on education (including spending on vouchers),
per-pupil spending in public school would increase as students depart with vouchers. If vouch-
ers also go to those currently attending private schools, then the increase in per-pupil spend-
ing would occur only if the number of students departing the public system is suﬃciently large.
29. Chubb and Moe (1990), for instance, argue such points, as do others.
30. Manski (1992) formalizes this type of trade-oﬀ in a single-district context. Epple and
Romano (1998) and Caucutt (2001) add a diﬀerent type of eﬃciency gain when they allow
private schools to price peer externalities, a point I do not investigate here.skimming by private schools of top students from the public schools. Again,
three types of vouchers are analyzed: universally available vouchers, vouch-
ers targeted only to residents of district 1, and vouchers targeted to the
poorest families (i.e., those earning below $25,000 per year). Naturally,
without the second counteracting force, the presence of just private school
cream-skimming implies that vouchers will have a tendency to lower public
school quality, although—perhaps surprisingly—not always and not pri-
marily in the district in which vouchers are being taken up. The subsequent
section then considers two types of potential eﬃciency-enhancing forces re-
sulting from increased competition—forces that will tend to produce re-
sults more favorable for those interested in promoting vouchers.
School Quality in the Absence of School Responses to Competition
Tables 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9 present public school variables as well as private
school attendance rates for each of the districts under diﬀerent levels of the
three types of vouchers for diﬀerent public school funding systems (local,
state, and a system calibrated to New Jersey). The cream-skimming eﬀect
of private schools is evident in the peer quality columns of these tables:
Higher peer quality students tend to leave the public school system as
vouchers are introduced, thus decreasing the average peer quality in the
public sector. However, because of the mobility forces described above, the
declines in public school peer quality are not as concentrated in school dis-
tricts that experience a decline in public school enrollment and an increase
in private school attendance. Rather, private schools are drawing high peer
quality students from all public schools even though marginal private
school–attending households reside in poorer districts as a result of moving
to take advantage of more favorable housing prices. For the same reason,
vouchers targeted to the poor district have impacts similar to untargeted
vouchers so long as voucher levels are modest: Because marginal house-
holds who take up vouchers tend to move to the better neighborhoods in the
poor district, the targeted nature of the voucher is relatively nonbinding as
long as voucher levels are not too high.31
Whether or not public school quality declines, however, depends on
whether or not the declines in average peer quality are oﬀset by increases in
per-pupil spending. In table 5.7 (under local ﬁnancing), public school qual-
ity shrinks relatively uniformly in all three districts, whereas in table 5.8 (un-
der state ﬁnancing), public school quality is relatively unchanged in all dis-
tricts (until voucher levels become high). The intuition for these results is
straightforward: As vouchers push high peer quality households into private
170 Thomas J. Nechyba
31. The diﬀerences and similarities between district-targeted and universal vouchers are dis-
cussed in detail in Nechyba (2000). That paper also demonstrates formally the clear intuition
emerging from the exercise that household income targeting has signiﬁcantly diﬀerent policy
implications from district targeting, again because of the mobility forces that arise in a multi-































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.schools, the political constituency for public school funding declines. At the
same time, the exit of some into the private sector implies that those re-
maining in public schools now receive more per-pupil funding for any given
tax rate—that is, voting for public school spending has just become cheaper.
All else being equal, the ﬁrst eﬀect causes the median voter to prefer less
public school spending, whereas the second eﬀect causes him to prefer more.
Under state funding, the latter eﬀect outweighs the former, causing increases
in per-pupil funding in public schools as voucher levels increase. The argu-
ment that vouchers result in a decrease in public school resources therefore
holds only for peer quality and not for school spending once the political
economy forces are taken into account under state ﬁnancing, and the net
eﬀect is relatively unchanged public school quality. In table 5.7, on the other
hand, public school quality in the poor district falls because per-pupil spend-
ing is determined by the constitutional minimum rather than the median
voter and thus does not change to oﬀset the decrease in peer quality. Eﬀects
in the other districts diﬀer, with some experiencing an increase in quality and
others a decrease. Finally, table 5.9 presents school outcomes for the New
Jersey calibrated state funding system, a hybrid system that includes both lo-
cal and state funding. Implications for public school quality are closer to
those under the state system, primarily because of the fact that state aid in
New Jersey insures that the poor district is not at some constitutionally min-
imum spending level but, rather, determined in a local public choice equilib-
rium. Only when more than 50 percent of the population attends private
school in the poor district does public school quality suﬀer considerably.
Including both the multidistrict nature of public schools and a political
economy model for the setting of public school spending therefore casts
doubt on the common perception emerging from single-district, non-
political-economy models that public schools are bound to decline in qual-
ity unless competition itself produces considerable eﬃciency gains. Here,
the two additions to the model undo much of the negative eﬀect of cream-
skimming private schools by allowing those remaining in the public school
system to free-ride on the contributions of others and to beneﬁt from mo-
bility forces that insure declines in peer quality will not be concentrated in
only those districts that experience the biggest declines in public school at-
tendance. While the model certainly does not rule out the possibility that
public schools will suﬀer in the absence of competitive eﬃciency gains, it
does suggest this eﬀect to be smaller and less concentrated than one might
have imagined. Variances in school outcomes (not reported in the tables)
similarly do not change signiﬁcantly.
School Quality When Public Schools Respond to Competition
The simulation results in the absence of a competitive eﬃciency eﬀect can
then serve as a benchmark, and any eﬃciency-enhancing impact of compe-
174 Thomas J. Nechybatition would be expected to improve the impact of vouchers (as in the single-
district models; Manski 1992). Eﬃciency-enhancing eﬀects could in prin-
ciple come in many forms, but I focus in this section on two types of pos-
sible competition-induced changes in the production relationship.
Essentially, the production function has two inputs, and competition could
aﬀect either one of these. In the case of peer quality, we have assumed thus
far that only average peer quality matters. It is conceivable, however, that
the variance matters as well. If two schools are identical in every way (i.e.,
average peer quality and average spending) except that school A has a
greater variance in peer quality than school B, school B may well be able to
more eﬀectively target its resources to the student population’s needs be-
cause those needs are more uniform across the student population. I will re-
fer to this eﬀect as curriculum targeting.In the case of spending, on the other
hand, it is often argued that the marginal product of a dollar of spending
will rise in public schools as those schools face greater competition. This
eﬀect will be referred to as competitive eﬃciency gain. Each of these eﬀects
is included in separate simulations reported below.
More precisely, tables 5.10, 5.11, and 5.12 present simulation results for
universal, district-targeted, and household-targeted vouchers, respec-
tively, for the case of both curriculum targeting and competitive eﬃciency
gains. The curriculum-targeting eﬀect is modeled as a constant   in front
of the school production function (2) that declines as the variance of peer
quality increases,32 and the competitive eﬃciency eﬀect is modeled as a
similar constant in the public school production function that rises in the
percentage of private school attendance in all three districts combined.33
Both of these changes in production functions aﬀect only public schools,
but each does so in a diﬀerent way. The curriculum targeting is public
school–specific in that it aﬀects the production functions in diﬀerent dis-
tricts diﬀerently as school population variances changed. The competitive
gain, on the other hand, aﬀects all public school production functions
similarly in that it provides an overall measure of the competitive pres-
sures faced by the public system. These changes of course require recali-
brations of various parameters of the model in order to replicate some-
thing close to the benchmark quantities in table 5.2. For the sake of
brevity, I forgo a detailed discussion of this calibration process and in-
stead simply note that the size of the two types of public school responses
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32. This constant is   (1 –  1 ∗ variance) for all schools, where   is calibrated jointly with
  to match private school attendance rates in the absence of vouchers. Given zero variance in
peer quality for private schools, the private school production function is eﬀectively un-
changed by this (i.e.,   1 in equilibrium for all private schools).
33. This constant is   (1 –  2 ∗ PUB2) for public schools and   1 for private schools,
where PUB is the fraction of the population attending public schools and  2 is calibrated
jointly with   to match private school attendance rates in the absence of vouchers.modeled in the simulations I report represents the midpoint of a feasible
range of such eﬀects.34
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Table 5.10 School Quality and Vouchers under New Jersey Calibration and Universally
Available Vouchersa
Average Variance Attending
Private After/ Private Public School Qualityc
Voucher School Variance School
Amount Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Quality Befored (%)
Schools Become More Eﬃcient through Curriculum Targetingb
$0 0.4167 0.5922 0.7761 1.1628 — 18.67
$1,000 0.4528 0.6012 0.7705 1.1167 0.9721 23.50
$2,500 0.4770 0.6216 0.7679 1.0335 0.9512 29.25
$4,000 0.4833 0.6277 0.7802 0.9411 0.9481 36.33
$5,000 0.4551 0.6014 0.7522 0.8623 0.9551 46.66
Schools Become More Eﬃcient through More Eﬃcient Resource Utilizatione
$0 0.4023 0.6121 0.7629 1.1711 — 19.25
$1,000 0.4127 0.6233 0.7771 1.1018 0.9891 24.33
$2,500 0.4273 0.6421 0.7849 1.0911 0.9821 27.25
$4,000 0.4351 0.6591 0.8033 1.0300 0.9755 32.66
$5,000 0.4391 0.6718 0.8116 1.0029 0.9812 33.00
aThese simulations introduce vouchers funded by the state through an increase in the state income tax
suﬃcient to balance state budgets. A household can redeem the value of the voucher as part or all of tu-
ition at any private school that will accept the household’s child, and all households—regardless of resi-
dence and income—are eligible for the voucher. All public schools are funded through a mix of local
property and state income taxes under a formula replicating the New Jersey ﬁnance system in 1987. This
set of simulations assumes cream-skimming by private schools and some responses from public schools
to increased competition.
bThe simulations involving “curriculum targeting” assume that school quality is related inversely to the
variance in peer quality—that is, all else being equal, a lower variance in peer quality is better because
teaching can be more targeted to particular student needs.
cPublic school quality in this set of simulations is not only a function of public school spending and aver-
age peer quality, but also a function of the variance in peer quality within the school.
dThis column reports the overall variance in school quality consumed by all children—those in public and
private schools.
eSimulations invoking eﬃciency of resource utilization assume that the marginal product of a dollar in
per-pupil spending in public schools increases with the level of private school competition (attendance).
Private schools are assumed to use resources eﬃciently regardless of the level of private school atten-
dance. Public school quality in this set of simulations is a function not only of per-pupil spending and av-
erage peer quality but also of the degree of private school competition (attendance).
34. The   constants in the curriculum-targeting and the competitive gain formulations of
production functions can of course be set at various levels and thus introduce competitive
eﬀects of various magnitudes. As alluded to earlier, the recalibration requires primarily a
change in the value  —the strength of the peer quality as opposed to spending in production.
More precisely, for any   constant that is chosen for either the curriculum-targeting or the
competitive gain speciﬁcation, public school quality falls while private school quality remains
constant. Maintaining benchmark levels of private school attendance requires lowering the
value of peer quality in production, the factor that gives private school their other competitive
advantage. There is, however, an upper bound to how high   can be and still produce onlyTable 5.10 focuses on curriculum targeting where improvements in public
school production processes hinge on each school’s variance in peer qual-
ity. Since migration patterns are similar to those discussed in section 5.4.1,
this eﬀect is most pronounced in district 1, which experiences the greatest
decline in student population and with it the greatest increase in peer qual-
ity homogeneity. As a result, public school quality rises most in district 1,
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Table 5.11 School Quality and Vouchers under New Jersey Calibration and District 1
Targeted Vouchersa
Average Variance Attending
Private After/ Private Public School Qualityc
Voucher School Variance School
Amount Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Quality Befored (%)
Schools Become More Eﬃcient through Curriculum Targetingb
$0 0.4167 0.5922 0.7761 1.1628 — 18.67
$1,000 0.4613 0.5892 0.7783 1.1218 0.9721 23.25
$2,500 0.4852 0.5923 0.7811 1.0613 0.9512 26.12
$4,000 0.4925 0.6011 0.7734 1.0015 0.9481 26.12
$5,000 0.4727 0.5985 0.7692 0.9476 0.9551 35.25
Schools Become More Eﬃcient through More Eﬃcient Resource Utilizatione
$0 0.4023 0.6121 0.7629 1.1711 — 19.25
$1,000 0.4096 0.6186 0.7685 1.1102 0.9932 24.25
$2,500 0.4111 0.6322 0.7774 1.1033 0.9906 26.00
$4,000 0.4171 0.6556 0.7813 1.0731 0.9843 29.50
$5,000 0.4219 0.6555 0.7938 1.0663 0.9892 30.25
aThese simulations introduce vouchers funded by the state through an increase in the state income tax
suﬃcient to balance state budgets. A household can redeem the value of the voucher as part or all of tu-
ition at any private school that will accept the household’s child, but only households who reside in dis-
trict 1 qualify for the voucher. All public schools are funded through a mix of local property and state in-
come taxes under a formula replicating the New Jersey ﬁnance system in 1987. This set of simulations
assumes cream-skimming by private schools and some responses from public schools to increased com-
petition.
bThe simulation involving “curriculum targeting” assume that school quality is related inversely to the
variance in peer quality—that is, all else being equal, a lower variance in peer quality is better because
teaching can be more targeted to particular student needs.
cPublic school quality in this set of simulations is not only a function of public school spending and aver-
age peer quality, but also a function of the variance in peer quality within the school.
dThis column reports the overall variance in school quality consumed by all children—those in public and
private schools.
eSimulations invoking eﬃciency of resource utilization assume that the marginal product of a dollar in
per-pupil spending in public schools increases with the level of private school competition (attendance).
Private schools are assumed to use resources eﬃciently regardless of the level of private school atten-
dance. Public school quality in this set of simulations is a function not only of per-pupil spending and av-
erage peer quality but also of the degree of private school competition (attendance).
modest private school attendance levels in the absence of vouchers. The simulations reported
here set the   constants in both the curriculum-targeting and the competitive gain speciﬁca-
tion of production processes to be the midpoint between this upper bound and the lower
bound of zero.although other districts experience a narrowing of the variance in their stu-
dent population as well even though the total population in those schools
does not decrease by as much. Average private school quality falls with in-
creasing private school enrollment because the marginal private school
choosers have lower peer quality and thus enjoy lower private school qual-
ity. Moreover, although those switching to private schools increase the over-
all variance in school outcomes, those remaining in public schools now
experience higher school quality and thus bring about a counteracting
narrowing in the overall variance of outcomes. Finally, since the public
school responds under these simulations, private school attendance does
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Table 5.12 School Quality and Vouchers under New Jersey Calibration and Vouchers Targeted
to Households with Incomes below $25,000a
Average Variance Attending
Private After/ Private Public School Qualityc
Voucher School Variance School
Amount Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Quality Befored (%)
Schools Become More Eﬃcient through Curriculum Targetingb
$0 0.4167 0.5922 0.7761 1.1628 — 18.67
$1,000 0.4167 0.5922 0.7761 1.1628 1.000 18.67
$2,500 0.4167 0.5922 0.7761 1.1628 1.000 18.67
$4,000 0.4439 0.5881 0.7734 1.0872 0.9822 21.85
$5,000 0.4623 0.5793 0.7702 0.9763 0.9719 27.33
Schools Become More Eﬃcient through More Eﬃcient Resource Utilizatione
$0 0.4023 0.6121 0.7629 1.1711 — 19.25
$1,000 0.4023 0.6121 0.7629 1.1711 1.000 19.25
$2,500 0.4023 0.6121 0.7629 1.1711 1.000 19.25
$4,000 0.3827 0.6281 0.7774 1.1005 1.041 23.50
$5,000 0.3540 0.6411 0.7829 1.0324 1.0720 26.67
aThese simulations introduce vouchers funded by the state through an increase in the state income tax
suﬃcient to balance state budgets. A household can redeem the value of the voucher as part or all of tu-
ition at any private school that will accept the household’s child, but only households whose income is be-
low $25,000 qualify for the voucher. All public schools are funded through a mix of local property and
state income taxes under a formula replicating the New Jersey ﬁnance system in 1987. This set of simula-
tions assumes cream-skimming by private schools and some responses from public schools to increased
competition.
bThe simulations involving “curriculum targeting” assume that school quality is related inversely to the
variance in peer quality—that is, all else being equal, a lower variance in peer quality is better because
teaching can be more targeted to particular student needs.
cPublic school quality in this set of simulations is not only a function of public school spending and aver-
age peer quality, but also a function of the variance in peer quality within the school.
dThis column reports the overall variance in school quality consumed by all children—those in public and
private schools.
eSimulations invoking eﬃciency of resource utilization assume that the marginal product of a dollar in
per-pupil spending in public schools increases with the level of private school competition (attendance).
Private schools are assumed to use resources eﬃciently regardless of the level of private school atten-
dance. Public school quality in this set of simulations is a function not only of per-pupil spending and av-
erage peer quality but also of the degree of private school competition (attendance).not rise as quickly with increases in voucher amounts as it does in previous
simulations without competitive eﬀects. Results are similar for district-
targeted vouchers (table 5.11) as they are for universal vouchers, although
private school take-up rates are predictably smaller when eligibility is re-
stricted solely to one district. Similar forces also operate in table 5.12 for
household-targeted vouchers, although changes are modest (or absent for
low levels of vouchers) given the limited impact on migration discussed in
the previous section.
The lower portions of tables 5.10, 5.11, and 5.12 oﬀer simulation results
under the assumption of a competitive eﬀect. Here, the eﬀect on public
school production functions is the same across all public schools because
the competitive pressure on the entire public school system is modeled,
rather than school-speciﬁc eﬀects (as under curriculum targeting). Thus,
improvements in public schools are more uniform across all districts, and
private school take-up rates are lower. Again, for the same reasons as under
curriculum targeting, average private school quality falls as more house-
holds choose private schools. Moreover, the overall variance in educational
outcomes falls slightly. A comparison of results for targeted versus univer-
sal vouchers gives rise to predictable diﬀerences in take-up rates under
higher levels of the voucher.
The broad conclusion regarding school quality under vouchers in this
model, is then, that the impact on average educational opportunities as well
as the variance in such opportunities depends on what assumptions are
made regarding the responses by public schools. In the base case in which
cream-skimming by private schools was permitted but no competitive re-
sponse on the part of public schools was assumed, average public school
quality remains relatively constant under some public ﬁnancing and de-
clines slightly under others (unless voucher levels become very high).35
When diﬀerent types of competitive eﬀects are included, on the other hand,
both average public school quality and overall average school quality can
rise substantially, and the variance in outcomes may drop somewhat. Im-
pacts tend to be strongest for vouchers that induce large migrations, which
occurs under universally available vouchers and even more so under district
targeted voucher. Such migrations are, however, signiﬁcantly more muted
when vouchers are targeted to low-income households.
5.4.3 Robustness of Results on Segregation and School Quality
Finally, we return to the issue of residential segregation. In section 5.4.1,
it was demonstrated that residential segregation can be aﬀected signiﬁ-
cantly by the introduction of vouchers, especially vouchers targeted to
poor districts. These results were arrived at in simulations that ignored any
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35. Overall average quality, including private schools, was not reported but stays relatively
constant or falls slightly in the benchmark cases. Overall variances rise as well.potential competitive eﬀects. Table 5.13 then provides comparisons of in-
dicators of residential segregation for both centralized and decentralized
public school systems when the two types of competitive eﬀects we intro-
duced in section 5.4.2 are included. These results indicate that the segre-
gation eﬀects raised in section 5.4.1 are robust to the inclusion of such
eﬀects.36
5.5 Empirical Foundation and Testable Implications
The simulations reported in section 5.4, and the model structure of sec-
tion 5.3 that gives rise to these simulation results, oﬀer a variety of predic-
tions regarding the policy impact of expanded private school choice. Al-
though it is diﬃcult to test these predictions directly (due to the current lack
of a suﬃciently large policy experiment of this kind in the United States),
the model itself does have testable implications that can be analyzed with
current data, and some of the key foundations of the model can be empiri-
cally challenged. This section provides a brief discussion of both the empir-
ical foundations and the testable implications arising from the model, and
some of the available empirical evidence that speaks to these.
5.5.1 Foundations of the Model: Tastes, Housing Markets, and Mobility
In arriving at a model that has the potential to replicate both the current
interdistrict diﬀerences in public school quality and the heterogeneity of in-
come and property values within jurisdictions, two possible avenues are
available to the economic theorist: First, he could model the outcome as a
result of taste diﬀerences, where household tastes diﬀer over housing or
school quality, and both high- and low-income households settle in juris-
dictions with similar school quality as a result.37 This approach is put forth
by Epple and Platt (1998), empirically implemented by Epple and Sieg
(1999), and will henceforth be called the Epple-Platt-Sieg (EPS) approach.
A second alternative approach—and the one taken in this paper—is to as-
sume that households share preferences but the housing market, whether
because of zoning regulations or historical evolution, oﬀers only limited
bundles of school quality and housing combinations. In particular, this ap-
proach assumes that low-quality housing is relatively more concentrated in
some districts, which then results endogenously in relatively worse public
schools in those districts. Both approaches can be reconciled with the data,
but both contain underlying assumptions that are problematic for policy
analysis. Below we discuss several of these as they relate to some other lit-
erature.
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36. Results for public school ﬁnance systems calibrated to results for New Jersey show sim-
ilar robustness but are not reported explicitly.
37. Without heterogeneity in preferences, this model results in perfect stratiﬁcation of in-





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The EPS approach treats housing as a good similar to other types of
goods in that, at any particular location, consumption of the good can be
changed in either direction as conditions change. From the urban econom-
ics literature we know, of course, that housing is a rather durable good, and
although it is often possible to increase housing quantity or quality at a par-
ticular location, it is not similarly possible to decrease these (except through
depreciation in the long run). The approach taken in this paper, on the other
hand, models housing as entirely ﬁxed and thus does not permit quality im-
provements of the kind that might be made under certain policy changes
while precluding the unrealistic decreases in housing quantity allowed un-
der the EPS model. Thus, one model seems to err in the direction of allow-
ing too many types of changes in housing consumption at a particular lo-
cation, whereas the other errs in the direction of permitting too few.
Empirical discussion of this issue is primarily embedded in the literature
on local property taxation, with the “New View” of the property tax argu-
ing for the EPS model of housing markets and the “Beneﬁt View” arguing
for a model similar to that in this paper.38As a result, the New View suggests
that taxation of residential property is primarily taxation of all forms of
capital because higher property taxes simply imply a ﬂeeing of capital from
housing to other uses, whereas the Beneﬁt View argues that the local prop-
erty tax, through both direct payments and capitalization eﬀects, approxi-
mates a local beneﬁts tax. Unfortunately, diﬀerent versions of both these
views are diﬃcult to empirically distinguish, and much of the debate there-
fore centers on the degree to which zoning in fact keeps housing stocks at
particular locations ﬁxed. Thus, the literature oﬀers little guidance as to
which model is more correct.39
For purposes of analyzing the forces discussed in this paper, however, the
latter approach has one distinct advantage over the EPS approach. First, to
whatever extent a bias in the policy prediction is introduced, it is predictable
that the bias is in the direction of making the forces weaker rather than
stronger. In particular, the model predicts that vouchers, by disentangling
housing and schooling choices and resulting in various general equilibrium
price eﬀects, will tend to cause middle- to high-income households to settle
in poorer districts to send their children to private schools. High-quality
housing in these districts is, of course, limited, and were these migrants
to change housing stocks, they would be likely to improve them. This ad-
ditional flexibility would cause migration forces to become more pro-
nounced, thus causing predictions regarding mobility to represent a con-
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38. Recent expositions of this debate can be found in Fischel (2001) and Zodrow (2001).
39. For a discussion of the diﬃculty in ﬁnding testable implications that distinguish between
these views, see Nechyba (2001).servative lower bound. It is not clear that a similar direction for the bias in-
troduced by the EPS housing model could be determined were a similar pol-
icy exercise undertaken in such a model. In addition, the model employed
in this paper allows for a calibration of housing quality to include various
other neighborhood features (through the use of market prices in the cali-
bration exercise) even though it then holds these features ﬁxed as policies
change. Here again, however, the assumption of ﬁxed neighborhood fea-
tures biases the predictions downward by not allowing middle- to high-
income immigrants to low-income districts to improve local neighborhoods
in ways other than schooling.
Diﬀerences in Tastes
Second, because of the perfect ﬂexibility of housing choices at each loca-
tion, the EPS model requires preferences to vary in order to generate het-
erogeneity of household income and house prices within districts.40Because
housing markets themselves are calibrated to yield this within-district het-
erogeneity in this paper, no heterogeneity in tastes is required. Although
taste heterogeneity could easily be introduced into the model used in this
paper, it is preferable of course not to do so unless it is either necessary in
order for the model to match the important features of the data or unless
there is strong empirical evidence suggesting how such heterogeneity
should be introduced. The empirical literature in this area is still evolving,
although recent work by Bayer (1999) suggests that the hypothesis of per-
sistent taste diﬀerences for education in diﬀerent income or racial/ethnic
groups can be largely rejected.
Mobility and School Choice
Much of what is reported in this paper would be of little value if school
choice and residential choice were not indeed closely linked. However, the
empirical evidence in this regard is overwhelming (and discussed in part
earlier in the paper). Capitalization studies, starting with Oates (1969) and
continuing with recent papers such as Black (1999), have consistently con-
ﬁrmed the importance of school quality in housing prices, thus providing
evidence that housing choices are based in part on perceptions of local
public schools. Even more recently, Figlio and Lucas (2000) provide fasci-
nating evidence of how quickly this process happens as perceptions of
public school quality change when new information is provided.41Similarly,
discrete choice studies have linked residential location choices more di-
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40. In the absence of such heterogeneity in tastes, households segregate perfectly into dis-
tricts (Epple, Filimon, and Romer 1993).
41. The state of Florida began assigning grades to school in order to determine who quali-
ﬁes for school-targeted vouchers under the new statewide voucher initiative. Figlio and Lucas
demonstrate the immediacy with which seemingly new information that is revealed aﬀects
prices, and how these prices change as additional information becomes available.rectly to the costs of living in particular school districts and the beneﬁts
from local public school quality.42 The notion that households consider
school quality when choosing residences is therefore rather uncontrover-
sial, and the model in this paper simply assumes that this consideration of
school quality does not change under new policy regimes. The only re-
maining issue is the speed with which it is reasonable to assume mobility to
play out, an issue diﬃcult to analyze in the static model of this paper. It is
unlikely, for instance, that households would respond immediately by
changing residences, but with mobility rates (for non-school-related rea-
sons) as high as they are in the United States, the process may be shorter
than otherwise expected.
5.5.2 Testable Implications
Section 5.5.1 was concerned with direct challenges to the foundations of
the model underlying the simulation results. We now turn to consider more
directly the testable implications of this model. A variety of such implica-
tions regarding mobility, segregation, private school formation, and school
quality changes from increased choice policies arise from the simulations in
section 5.4, but these cannot be tested directly without a large policy exper-
iment. Several other related implications, however, are testable and are dis-
cussed below.
Voting on Voucher Initiatives
The model has rather straightforward predictions regarding the distribu-
tion of beneﬁts from voucher policies. Beneﬁts arise in two areas: First,
households with high peer quality can more easily improve the school qual-
ity of their children by choosing private schools, and other households may
beneﬁt from better public schools if a competitive eﬀect of the types incor-
porated into some simulations arises. Second, every household—whether
in the public or private system—is aﬀected through changes in household
wealth as housing prices change dramatically. Results from the model sug-
gest that, for most households, the latter eﬀect may outweigh the former—
at least for versions of the model that do not include a large competitive eﬃ-
ciency improvement from increased choice. More precisely, the model
predicts that homeowners in good public school districts will tend to expe-
rience large capital losses, whereas homeowners in poor school districts will
tend to experience large capital gains.
The empirical implication for homeowners is therefore straightforward:
One would expect support for broad-based private school vouchers to vary
inversely with local public school quality. Of course, a similar implication
for homeowners arises from a diﬀerent model that simply generates a
greater desire for vouchers in districts with worse public schools because
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42. See Nechyba and Strauss (1998) and references therein as well as Bayer (1999).parents in those districts are more dissatisﬁed with public education. The
two models can be empirically distinguished, however, by drawing a dis-
tinction between renters and owners who are similarly aﬀected by public
schools but diﬀerently aﬀected by changes in property values. In particular,
renters in poor school districts would be adversely aﬀected by higher rents
resulting from vouchers under the model in this paper, whereas renters in
good school districts would beneﬁt from lower rents. At the same time,
renters and homeowners go to the same public schools and thus would not
diﬀer in their support for vouchers under the alternative model.
Thus, the testable implication arising from this model is that renters and
homeowners will diﬀer in their support for vouchers, with homeowners in
good districts opposing vouchers due to the fear of capital losses and home-
owners in poor districts favoring vouchers due to anticipated capital gains.
Renters would be expected to exhibit the reverse preferences, with those in
good school districts looking forward to lower rents and those in poor dis-
tricts anticipating higher rents. These implications are formalized by Brun-
ner, Sonstelie, and Thayer (2000) and tested for the case of the California
statewide voucher initiative that was defeated in the election of 1994. Their
results provide strong evidence for the hypothesis that homeowners in good
districts voted against vouchers to protect their property values. When im-
plications regarding renters versus homeowners are tested against an alter-
native hypothesis, the analysis provided no additional conclusive evidence
one way or another.
Residential Location, School Choice, and Family Size
Although the model assumes each family has a single child, the implica-
tions of the model for families with diﬀerent numbers of children is straight-
forward but, to my knowledge, remains untested. In particular, the choice
of private school is one that brings with it a relatively constant marginal cost
per child, whereas this may not be the case for the choice of high-quality
public schools to which a family can gain access by residing in that school’s
district. A family with three children, for instance, must pay roughly the
same private school tuition for each of its children if private schools are cho-
sen, whereas the same family pays a lump-sum “capitalization fee” when
choosing a house in the good public school district. Of course, house size
also increases with family size, and thus the marginal cost of sending an ad-
ditional child to public school is not zero. Nevertheless, it is likely to be less
than private school tuition,43 which gives the implication that, all else being
equal, families with more children would choose good public schools
whereas families with few children would more likely choose private schools
in poorer public school districts.
Introducing School Choice into Multidistrict Public School Systems 185
43. In principle this can also be tested, and, were it not the case, the implication would run
in the opposite direction.Evidence from Current Experiments
Although private school choice experiments in the United States at this
point are too small to give rise to eﬀects such as those simulated in this pa-
per, there are other types of choice arrangements for which the model has
similar testable implications. For instance, large numbers of charter and
magnet schools in various states do not use the residence-based admissions
criteria so common in the rest of the public school system. Although clearly
diﬀerent from private school choice in that no tuition requirements are
made of parents and various regulations inhibit the more extreme forms of
cream-skimming, the introduction of such choice vehicles within the public
system does weaken the link between residential and school choices. If such
arrangements are widespread in a given geographic region, then mobility
and price eﬀects similar to those predicted in the simulations of section 5.4
should emerge.
Similarly, public school choice programs (such as those in Minnesota)—
to the extent that they oﬀer true choice rather than having good public
schools close their doors by claiming capacity constraints—similarly alter
the link between residential location and school choice. As a result, a model
similar to that applied to private school choice in this paper would sug-
gest capitalization eﬀects that reflect this change. Research on this topic,
to my knowledge, has been limited, although Reback (2002) provides ev-
idence that mobility forces of the type raised in section 5.4.1 may play an
important role.
Finally, the model oﬀers predictions regarding private school formation,
residential segregation, housing price diﬀerences, and so on for diﬀerent
types of state funding systems for public schools, but these are explored
elsewhere (Nechyba 1999, forthcoming). Given the diversity of such state
systems as well as their changing nature over the past few decades, such
state diﬀerences provide yet another opportunity to test predictions other
than those related to increasing choice. One notable test comes out of the
1970s California experience, when school ﬁnance changed rapidly and gave
rise to a large number of private schools in a relatively short period of time.
Downes and Greenstein (1996) present evidence on these private school
formations and particularly the location of new private schools. Consistent
with predictions arising from the model in this paper, they show that private
schools tended to form in lower-income districts and near poorly perform-
ing public schools.
5.6 Policy Implications
The large policy implication emerging not only from the simulations re-
ported in this paper but also from the broader research project referenced
throughout is that, given the evidence that the links of residential, political,
186 Thomas J. Nechybaand school choices are strong in the current system, these links are poten-
tially important for a variety of school ﬁnance policies, including the pro-
posal of expanding choice through vouchers. When models abstract away
from these links, the debate on vouchers becomes a stylized argument over
which of two forces—the cream-skimming of private schools or the eﬃ-
ciency enhancements of increased choice—is likely to dominate. As a mat-
ter of theoretical exploration, limiting models to considering only some
forces in isolation is, of course, extremely valuable and has provided nu-
merous insights, some of which are included in the simulation exercises
above. However, as a matter of policy analysis, forces that are best analyzed
in isolation for conceptual clariﬁcation must ultimately be analyzed in a
single framework.
The exercise in this paper is therefore one of expanding the framework
within which we analyze the merits of vouchers to include components that
move us away from a narrow debate and toward utilizing empirical facts
that are less controversial than those asserted in much of the debate. These
facts include (a) the current public school system is far from a homogeneous
ideal and full of inequities that are commonly acknowledged in the litera-
ture; (b) these inequities are due largely to a linkage of residential and
school choices that oﬀer real school choice to only those who can aﬀord to
live in multiple types of school districts; (c) the forces that have shaped cur-
rent schools under the current choice environment are unlikely to change as
choice is expanded; (d) political processes are important and will probably
continue to be important in setting school spending and thus school qual-
ity diﬀerences; and (e) private schools arising from voucher policies are
likely to search out high peer quality students over low peer quality stu-
dents. It is only after ﬁnding implications from these primitives that we have
moved on to consider additional forces that are more controversial.
5.6.1 Winners and Losers from Vouchers
Most policies have clear winners and losers. In the case of private school
vouchers, however, the problem of identifying precisely who wins and who
loses is not an easy one. The analysis in this paper oﬀers an opportunity to
suggest which households are likely to deﬁnitely win, which might win un-
der diﬀerent assumptions, and which are most likely to lose. The gains and
losses to households in the model arise from two diﬀerent eﬀects: First,
most households will experience some change in the school quality con-
sumed by their children, and, second, homeowners are likely to experience
capital gains or losses as changing school choice aﬀects market prices.44We
can discuss each of these in turn.
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44. A third avenue through which households are aﬀected is through changing tax burdens,
but we forgo a detailed analysis of these eﬀects here. Furthermore, households already at-
tending private schools beneﬁt from lump-sum transfers through the voucher.Winners and Losers in School Quality
With respect to winners and losers in terms of educational quality, the in-
tuitions arising from this model are similar to those in the current single-
district literature. Because private schools are assumed to gain a competi-
tive advantage through their ability to exclude low peer quality students, it
is clearly high peer quality students that are most likely to experience im-
provements in their school quality. In the context of the model in this paper,
peer quality arises from both family income and child ability. Thus, rela-
tively high ability children from high-income households who do not
choose private schools before vouchers are put in place are the ﬁrst to ben-
eﬁt from higher private school quality. Conversely, low-ability children from
low-income households are likely to see little beneﬁt or modest declines in
their school quality as either public schools decrease in quality or they are
forced to choose a private school with only their peer type. Similarly, low-
ability children from higher-income households do not switch to private
schools unless voucher amounts become high, and they, too, experience
similar modest declines in their public school quality. The main additional
insight oﬀered by the model here over previous single-district models is that
declines in public school quality are likely to be spread across districts even
if private schools themselves arise primarily in poor districts, and because
of this they are not likely to be as large as might otherwise be predicted (or
may in fact be absent for some school ﬁnancing systems). An important
caveat to this, however, is that a restriction of vouchers to only poor house-
holds (as opposed to a targeting to poor districts) gives rise to sharper losses
for public schools in poor districts once vouchers are taken up at high rates,
and competitive eﬀects are not readily spread to other districts whose pop-
ulations do not qualify for the voucher regardless of where they move.
The prediction becomes signiﬁcantly more rosy, however, as competitive
eﬀects are introduced. Since public school quality now generally increases,
all children can in principle beneﬁt from the introduction of vouchers. The
precise nature of this competitive eﬀect is, of course, important, as is the na-
ture of the voucher itself. Particular concern for children who remain in
poor public schools is warranted both because they are most likely to suﬀer
in the absence of a competitive eﬀect within the context of this model, and
because of empirical evidence from abroad suggesting the possibility that
choice may leave those children behind even when beneﬁting most other
children.45Furthermore, the simulations suggest that vouchers limited only
to low-income families (as opposed to low-income districts) carry with
them a bigger potential threat to public schools in the poorest districts. The
ambiguity regarding the likely impact of vouchers on those children that re-
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45. In particular, Fiske and Ladd (2000) present compelling evidence that this has occurred
under the public school choice reforms in New Zealand.main in low-income public school districts therefore suggests that voucher
initiatives—especially those motivated by concerns for poor children—
ought to be accompanied by strong eﬀorts to independently improve public
schools in those districts. Additionally, the insights regarding migration
eﬀects that are uncovered in this model suggest that district targeting is a
much more eﬀective way of limiting eligibility than household targeting,
both on eﬃciency grounds (because district targeting spreads the competi-
tive eﬀect throughout the public school system) and on equity grounds.
Winners and Losers in Housing Markets
Winners and losers in housing markets are more easily identiﬁed. As al-
ready discussed in the section on “Voting on Voucher Initiatives,” and de-
spite the fact that renters are not speciﬁcally included in the model of this
paper, we can predict from the results in this model that homeowners and
renters are aﬀected diﬀerently.46In particular, homeowners in good districts
experience relatively large capital losses while homeowners in poor school
districts experience capital gains. Renters, of course, do not experience such
gains and losses. Finally, to the extent that neighborhood eﬀects may spread
beyond school buildings, the desegregating eﬀect of vouchers may have ad-
ditional beneﬁts for poor districts that are not modeled in this paper.
5.6.2 Implications for Targeting Vouchers
After the failure of broad-based vouchers to pass the political test in sev-
eral state referenda, it now seems likely that voucher policies, to the extent
that they will be enacted, will be targeted in some way. Current experiments
at the city level are following that pattern with only low-income families
qualifying for vouchers, and the only statewide plan to pass a legislature and
be enacted (in Florida) has targeted vouchers to underperforming schools,
as does the Bush proposal at the national level. However, the two kinds of
targeting—toward low-income households or low-income or underper-
forming schools—are predicted to have very diﬀerent implications within
the framework of this paper.
More precisely, vouchers targeted to low-income families have little im-
pact in the context of this model unless the voucher amount is set quite high.
The reason for this is that household-targeted vouchers do not unleash sim-
ilar mobility and capitalization eﬀects because moving would have little
value to anyone whose income is too high to receive the voucher. District
targeting, on the other hand, creates the incentive to move in order to take
advantage of private schools. Vouchers targeted to low-income households
would therefore not give rise to the forces that a multidistrict model picks
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46. Including renters does not alter the positive predictions of the model signiﬁcantly be-
cause the capital gains and losses for homeowners (which are absent for renters) produce only
income eﬀects that do not alter behavior in major ways. Renters would have similar incentives
to settle in poor districts if they choose private schools.up, and single-district models illustrating the trade-oﬀs between cream-
skimming private schools and beneﬁts from competition would give pre-
dictions similar to models of the kind employed in this paper. The clear pol-
icy implication, then, is that higher response rates are to be expected from
district targeting than from household targeting, and these are likely to have
greater eﬃciency and equity-enhancing consequences.
5.6.3 Designing Politically Feasible Vouchers
The diﬀerence in implications for diﬀerent types of targeting thus rests on
the fact that district targeting takes advantage of mobility forces whereas
household targeting does not, and this may lead policymakers to view dis-
trict targeting as a more eﬀective tool to infuse competition into the public
school system. On the other hand, this diﬀerence makes district targeting
considerably less politically palatable to the population as a whole unless
large competitive gains in public schools are expected. More speciﬁcally,
district targeting aﬀects homeowners in ways very similar to no targeting at
all, with homeowners in wealthy districts suﬀering and homeowners in poor
districts gaining. If voters are aware of such eﬀects when expressing politi-
cal preference for or against vouchers (as Brunner, Sonstelie, and Thayer
2000 suggest California voters were in 1994), homeowners in good school
districts are almost as likely to be opposed to district-targeted vouchers as
they are to universal vouchers. Put diﬀerently, targeting to households in-
stead of districts would in eﬀect isolate homeowners in such districts from
capital losses.
Thus, the same factors that cause district targeting to be a more potent
policy tool are likely to make it politically more diﬃcult to implement. A
trade-oﬀ between policy impact and political feasibility therefore emerges
for policymakers. This trade-oﬀis unlikely to be optimally resolved at either
extreme (i.e., pure district targeting or pure household targeting) and is
more likely to involve a combination of district targeting with income
phaseouts. To the extent that higher-income households are ineligible for
vouchers, this reduces the mobility and capitalization eﬀects but may in-
crease their willingness to agree to the proposal. On the other hand, if com-
petitive eﬀects are sought, these too are diminished as income phaseouts be-
come more severe. A detailed analysis of this trade-oﬀ is, however, beyond
the scope of this paper.
5.6.4 Short Run versus Long Run
A ﬁnal issue worth raising involves the timing of changes and their im-
pact. The model in this paper has little to oﬀer in regard to this because it
does not include a multiperiod analysis during which households adjust to
policies. Rather, the model provides a snapshot of the prevoucher world and
another of the postvoucher prediction but is not equipped to analyze the
transition. The most critical issue is, of course, that of the speed at which
190 Thomas J. Nechybamobility forces come into play. Although I have cited evidence that price
adjustment to new education-related information are relatively fast, resi-
dential moves are typically undertaken for multiple reasons, with education
being only one. Thus, a likely transition would include household reloca-
tions for a variety of job- or family-related reasons, where the considera-
tions related to schools come into play once the decision to move has been
made on other grounds. As a result, those predictions related to mobility
are likely to take some time to unfold and require reasonable conﬁdence on
the part of households that policy changes are not just transitory.
In the short run, it may therefore be prudent to place some weight on re-
sults emerging from single-district models in which residential location is,
in eﬀect, assumed to be ﬁxed. As is mentioned throughout this paper, this
would imply considerably more negative short-run eﬀects of vouchers be-
cause the more positive eﬀects arise primarily from multidistrict considera-
tions. In addition, voucher take-up rates would be considerably more muted
in the short run, and decreases in public school quality more concentrated.
Therefore, although the model has little to oﬀer in terms of predicting the
length of time between short-run and long-run eﬀects, it does suggest that
a full evaluation of the impact of large-scale voucher programs will require
a considerable period of maintaining the policy in place.
5.7 Conclusion
In summary, this paper has placed the previously analyzed forces related
to private school vouchers into a multidistrict context that is capable of
more accurately establishing a prevoucher benchmark from which to con-
duct policy analysis. I have then argued that this gives rise to a number of
general equilibrium eﬀects that are important to such an analysis. Two main
conclusions emerge: First, most voucher policies have profound implica-
tions for how the broader set of choices that households make are under-
taken and how residential districts are likely to evolve, with vouchers oﬀer-
ing a large potential for reducing income segregation across district
boundaries. Second, the likely impact of private school vouchers on public
school quality depends on a number of assumptions regarding public
school responses, assumptions that all remain controversial. Under the
more pessimistic set of assumptions, public school quality may suﬀer as a
result of vouchers, although this decline would not be as large or as con-
centrated as predicted by a narrower single-district analysis. Under more
positive assumptions, on the other hand, public school quality may improve
through private school competition. In one case, overall school quality (in-
cluding private schools) remains relatively unchanged, with clear winners
and losers (in terms of educational opportunities), whereas in the other
cases both average quality and the variance in quality can improve signiﬁ-
cantly. Since the potential losers (in terms of school quality) under the more
Introducing School Choice into Multidistrict Public School Systems 191pessimistic assumptions of the model are the very poorest children who re-
main in public schools in poor districts, an important implication arising
from these simulations is that caution would dictate that strong eﬀorts to
independently improve public schools in poor districts accompany any
vouchers intended to help poor children. Similarly, the simulations suggest
a more hopeful picture for vouchers targeted to districts rather than vouch-
ers that are targeted to households. More empirical analysis is, of course, re-
quired in order to narrow the range of likely school quality outcomes under
diﬀerent types of voucher policies.
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